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Genetically engineered (GE) seeds are central to the debates around agricultural
biotechnology, and continue to be rapidly adopted across the globe. At the same time that
GE crops increase in acreage, the organic market has become one of the fastest growing
sectors of the American food industry. While biotechnology companies claim there is a
successful “coexistence” of GE crop technologies and organic crops, many organic
producers are already challenged by keeping unwanted GE traits out of their fields. Still,
little attention has been given to the role of regulations in the face of organic
contamination by genetically engineered material. This paper looks at the National
Organic Program (NOP) and Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of
Biotechnology, and analyzes whether they are adequate for protecting the integrity of
organic food in the face of genetic engineering, using a relatively new GE crop, Roundup
Ready (RR) alfalfa, as a case study. Alfalfa is an essential component to the organic
livestock industry, especially to organic dairy, where the demand has grown faster than
the supply. This paper reveals that the organic alfalfa industry is at risk of contamination
by RR alfalfa, and that part of the risk can be attributed to the inadequacy of the two
regulatory frameworks, as both do not go far enough to keep GE crops contained and the
integrity of organic products protected. These findings resulted from an extensive review
of the pertinent laws and regulations, a review of the U.S.’s experience with GE crop
technology, and research into the potential implications of introducing RR alfalfa.
Recommendations include making changes to the two frameworks’ approach to
regulation, including: making improvements to the regulation of GE crops both before
and after they enter the marketplace; encouraging discussion within the organic industry
about current threats to the integrity of organic, and the pros and cons of establishing a
tolerance level and testing system; and taking a precautionary approach to RR alfalfa by
performing a full Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), and pulling it from the market
until all risks are addressed.
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INTRODUCTION
The advent of agricultural biotechnology in the mid-1980s was met by both enthusiasm
and criticism, and continues to spark debate across the globe. Genetically engineered
(GE) seeds are central to these debates, which have drawn attention to a variety of social
and ecological issues that have as much to do with science as they do with cultural values
and ethics. Even in light of these debates, GE seeds continue to be readily adopted. For
instance, in 2000, 54 percent of soybeans planted in the U.S. were a GE variety; by 2006,
this percentage was 89 percent. 1 More GE plantings are taking place abroad, too. In
2005, 21 countries planted GE crops on over 220 million acres, an 11 percent increase
from 2004 (or 22 million acres). 2 The Grocery Manufacturers of America estimates that
70 percent of food on grocery shelves contains ingredients from GE crops. 3

Genetic engineering differs tremendously from traditional breeding mechanisms. The
National Research Council cites the general definition of a genetically engineered
organism as “an organism that has been modified by the application of recombinant DNA
technology.” 4 Unlike other breeding methods, genetic engineering operates at the cellular
and molecular level, and makes it possible to select and transfer a single gene, sometimes
between unrelated species. 5 For example, herbicide-tolerant plants are engineered to
express a gene derived from a soil bacterium, and other examples (though not on the
market) include tobacco and jellyfish genes in tomato plants and a soybean gene in

1

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. (2006). Adoption of Genetically Engineered
Crops in the U.S.: Soybeans, Retrieved May 2, 2006, from
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/biotechcrops/extentofadoptiontable3.htm
2
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech applications. (2005). ISAAA Briefs No. 342005, Retrieved on May 3, 2006, http://www.isaaa.org/kc/bin/briefs34/es/index.htm
3
Barboza, David. (2000, June 4). Modified foods put companies in a quandary [Electronic version], The
New York Times, Retrieved May 5, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/library/national/science/health/060400food-quandry-health.html
4
National Research Council. (2004). Biological Confinement of Genetically Engineered Organisms,
Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.
5
Ibid.; The process and products of recombinant DNA (rDNA) technology is referred to by several names,
including “genetically engineered (GE),” “genetically modified (GM),” “genetically modified organism
(GMO),” “bioengineered,” “biotech,” and “transgenic.” These labels are interchanged throughout this
paper, but preference is given to “genetically engineered” and “transgenic.”

1

lettuce. 6 Although agricultural biotechnology encompasses a host of organisms, including
fish, insects, and animals, for the purposes of this paper, I will focus on the regulation of
GE plants, specifically those engineered to tolerate the popular herbicide, Roundup
(generic name of the active ingredient is glyphosate).

Almost all GE crops currently on the market fall under the “first generation” category of
plants, which provide farmer-oriented traits, such as herbicide-tolerance, virus-resistance,
and insect-resistance. The vast majority of these varieties involve corn, soybean, canola,
and cotton plants. Few GE fruits and vegetables have been approved for commercial sale.
In fact, many of these are no longer on the market despite regulatory approval. “Second
generation” GE crops are engineered to express traits specific to nutritional and
pharmaceutical composition—“consumer-oriented” traits. The first of these next
generation plants is a soybean intended to reduce or eliminate trans fatty acid in a variety
of food products. 7

While biotechnology companies claim there is a successful “coexistence” of GE seed
technologies and conventional 8 (non-GE) seed, opponents of genetic engineering believe
the technology poses serious challenges for organic producers, 9 and, according to a
leading agroecologist, is one of the main barriers to achieving a truly sustainable
agriculture. 10 At the same time that there is increased adoption of GE crops, the organic
market has become one of the fastest growing sectors of the American food industry. 11
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) estimates it is growing by 20
6

Gene information taken from an overview of California field trial data at the Information Systems for
Biotechnology website. (2006). “Field Test Releases in the U.S.,” Retrieved on November 16, 2006 from,
(http://www.isb.vt.edu/cfdocs/fieldtests1.cfm)
7
USA: Kellogg moves to low linolenic oil to cut trans fats, (2005, December 9). Retrieved on May 2, 2006
from http://www.organicconsumers.org/ge/soyoil121205.cfm
8
Throughout this paper, I refer to seeds derived from traditional breeding methods as “conventional” or
“non-GE.”
9
Numerous producers throughout the world farm organically and rightfully call themselves organic
farmers, yet choose not to be certified. For purposes of this paper, “organic producer” or “organic farmer”
generally refers to those who are certified and regulated under the NOP.
10
Altieri, Miguel A. (2001). Genetic Engineering in Agriculture: The Myths, Environmental Risks, and
Alternatives, Oakland, CA: Food First Books.
11
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. (2006). Organic agriculture gaining ground
[Electronic version], Retrieved on April 20, 2006 on
www.ers.usda.gov/amberwaves/feb03/findings/organicagriculture.htm.
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percent or more each year, with some individual sectors, such as organic dairy, growing
by 60 percent in some parts of the country. 12 In 2003, the U.S. recorded over two million
acres of certified organic farmland, a 63 percent increase from 1997. 13 Because the
USDA National Organic Program (NOP) does not allow GE seed and feed in certified
organic systems, consumers rely on organic products as alternatives to food products that
contain GE ingredients. 14

Many organic producers are already challenged by keeping unwanted GE traits out of
their fields, and feel coexistence is premised on the unfounded belief that non-GE
markets will accept an increasing amount of GE material in products. 15 In June 1999, the
British government’s Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food released a report that
showed wind-borne pollen and bees could carry GE genes for miles, raising concerns that
it might become impossible to guarantee foods as GE-free. 16 Several recent events
validate this concern, 17 including the discovery of an unapproved rice variety in the U.S.
food supply, half of which is exported. 18 This announcement in 2006 caused Japan to halt

12

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. (2006). Organic agriculture gaining ground
[Electronic version], Retrieved on April 20, 2006 on
www.ers.usda.gov/amberwaves/feb03/findings/organicagriculture.htm; Mack, S.K. (2005, July 23).
Demand exceeds supply of organic milk in Maine [Electronic version], Bangor Daily News, Retrieved on
April 12, 2006, from
http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/bangor/access/871509821.html?dids=871509821:871509821&FMT=ABS&F
MTS=ABS:FT&date=Jul+23%2C+2005&author=SHARON+KILEY+MACK&pub=Bangor+Daily+News
&edition=&startpage=1&desc=Demand+exceeds+supply+of+organic+milk+in+Maine
13
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. (2006). Data Sets: Organic Production,
Retrieved on October 5, 2006 (http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/organic/)
14
In 1997, USDA received over 280,000 comments (mostly from consumers) opposing the agency’s
inclusion of genetically engineered organisms within its definitions of what constitutes “organic” in its
proposed NOP rule.
15
Vermont Public Interest Research Group. (2003, December). Blowing in the Wind, The Road to
Extinction for Vermont’s Organic Farms: Testing Confirms Genetic Pollution of Organically Grown Corn
[Electronic version], Montpelier, VT: Author, Retrieved on April 17, 2006, from
www.gefreevt.org/images/downloads/blowing%20in%20the%20wind%20report.pdf
16
Waugh, P. (1999, June 16). Official Data Reveals GM Crop Risks [Electronic version], UK Independent,
Retrieved on April 12, 2006, from http://www.intekom.com/tm_info/rw90620.htm#06
17
GeneWatch UK and Greenpeace International. (2005). GM Contamination Report, A Review of Cases of
Contamination, Illegal Planting, and Negative Side Effects of Genetically Modified Organisms, Retrieved
on April 1, 2006 from
www.genewatch.org/uploads/f03c6d66a9b354535738483c1c3d49e4/gm_contamination_report.pdf
18
Weiss, Rick. (2006, November 6). Biotech rice saga yields bushel of questions for feds [Electronic
version], The Washington Post, Retrieved on November 10, 2006, from
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/05/AR2006110501092.html; Transgenic
rice discovery disrupts U.S. exports [Electronic version]. (2006, August 29). Food Chemical News,
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rice imports from the U.S., and rice growers affected by the contamination wasted no
time in filing a lawsuit against Bayer CropScience, the manufacturer of the rice variety. 19

My research question is especially interesting and timely in light of a recently approved
GE alfalfa variety. In June 2005, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) announced
its approval of Roundup Ready (RR) alfalfa, a genetically engineered variety that
tolerates glyphosate, the main ingredient in the Monsanto Company’s trademark
herbicide, Roundup. It is the first genetically engineered perennial plant to be
commercialized for widespread planting in the U.S., and was produced by Monsanto in
partnership with the largest alfalfa seed company, Forage Genetics International (a
subsidiary of Land O’Lakes). 20

Alfalfa is an essential component to the organic livestock industry. Milk cows accounted
for over half of the total number of certified animals in 2001, and the total number of
certified organic livestock, including beef cattle, pigs, sheep and lambs, increased by 572
percent between 1997 and 2003. 21 Several events show the demand for alfalfa-derived
organic products is growing. For example, in 2005, California experienced a shortage in
organic feed, and is looking to North Dakota to increase production of corn, soybeans,
barley, peas and alfalfa. 22 California currently has to import organic feed from China and
South America to meet its rapidly growing demand for organic livestock and poultry
markets. The U.S. is also experiencing a shortage in organic milk. 23 While the shortage is
mostly attributed to a lack of certified organic cows, this demand is implicitly coupled
with a need for more organic alfalfa hay.
Retrieved on November 10, 2006, from
http://pewagbiotech.org/newsroom/summaries/display.php3?NewsID=1020
19
Weiss, Rick. (2006, November 6). Biotech rice saga yields bushel of questions for feds [Electronic
version], The Washington Post, Retrieved on November 10, 2006, from
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/05/AR2006110501092.html;
20
Genetically engineered papaya, grown primarily in Hawaii, is also a USDA-approved perennial GE
plant.
21
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. (2006). Data sets: organic production
[Electronic version], Retrieved on October 5, 2006, from http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/organic/; (Total
certified organic livestock equaled 18,513 in 1997, 74,435 in 2003.)
22
California organic farmers looking to North Dakota for feed. (2005, May 10). Valley City Times-Record.
23
Weinraub, J. & Nicholls, W. (2005, June 1). Organic Milk Supply Falls Short [Electronic version],
Washington Post, Retrieved on June 20, 2005, from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/05/31/AR2005053100363.html
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My interest in this topic stems from over five years of research and work in the non-profit
sector on agricultural biotechnology issues. I developed an interest in the regulation of
GE crops during a two-year position at the Center for Food Safety, a non-governmental
organization headquartered in Washington, DC that encourages the U.S. government to
take a precautionary approach to GE technologies, often through legal initiatives. I began
researching RR alfalfa almost two years ago, when I began to follow the development of
the new variety for a paper in a graduate course, and subsequently continued the research
through a fellowship at the Western Organization of Resource Councils in Billings, MT.
There, I researched the development of RR alfalfa; talked to organization members
(ranchers who grew or were familiar with alfalfa production) about their perspectives on
RR alfalfa; wrote newsletter articles and memos on the potential implications of
introducing RR alfalfa; gave presentations on RR alfalfa to chapter groups around the
West; and wrote a publication entitled A Guide to Genetically Modified Alfalfa. 24

While there are a lot of controversies around agricultural biotechnology and the organic
standards, little attention has been given to the role of regulations in the face of organic
contamination by genetically engineered material. An important exception is attorney
Michelle Friedman’s law review article on contamination issues in the context of the
NOP: You call that organic? The USDA’s misleading food regulations, which has been a
valuable resource in my research. The purpose of this paper is to look at two regulatory
frameworks—the NOP and Coordinated Framework—and identify if they protect the
integrity of organic products in the face of genetic engineering, using RR alfalfa as a case
study. That is, are the frameworks sufficient for keeping the two burgeoning industries
separate in the field and marketplace?

This paper is divided into three chapters. Chapter one gives an overview of the NOP and
Coordinated Framework, and describes how they address genetically engineered crops. In
2002, USDA introduced the NOP, the first federal standards to be implemented for the
24

Hubbard, Kristina. (2006). A guide to genetically modified alfalfa, Western Organization of Resource
Councils, www.worc.org/issues/art_issues/alfalfa_guide/alfalfa_guide.html.

5

purpose of providing a uniform organic standard given the previous patchwork of
certification, and to protect the integrity of, and consumers’ confidence in, certified
organic food. When GE crops were introduced, no new laws were implemented to
regulate them. Instead, three government agencies—USDA, Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)—regulate GE
crops under a patchwork of existing laws, most notably the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics
Act; The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act; The Toxic Substances
Control Act; and the Federal Plant Protection Act.

Chapter two explores the case of RR alfalfa by first describing the regulatory process that
Monsanto and Forage Genetics went through to introduce it, followed by an analysis of
the potential implications of introducing it, including agronomic, environmental, and
economic effects. The analysis draws from examples of other RR crops that have been in
the environment and marketplace for several years, such as RR corn and soybeans. RR
alfalfa is a timely and important case study, as it is the first perennial crop to be approved
for widespread planting, and is relatively new to the market. To the best of my
knowledge, there has not been an effort to comprehensively examine the implications of
introducing RR alfalfa for the organic industry. Using RR alfalfa as a case study in this
analysis helps to fill this gap in literature.

Given the potential implications of introducing RR alfalfa, chapter three analyzes and
assesses whether existing regulations are sufficient for protecting the integrity of organic
alfalfa. Building on arguments laid out in chapters one and two, I flesh out the adequacy
of the regulatory frameworks using RR alfalfa as a case study. This paper ends with a
substantial conclusion that discusses the potential role of the judicial system and outlines
policy recommendations. My hope is that these findings are useful to organic food
producers, processors, and marketers, as well as non-governmental organizations and
government officials interested in protecting the integrity of organic alfalfa seed and feed
sources through advocacy and policy.

6

1.

THE NATIONAL ORGANIC PROGRAM & COORDINATED FRAMEWORK
The organic food industry wanted to make sure that when people go out
and see the word ‘organic’ that it has a clear set of standards. . .and we
know that it clearly cannot include genetically engineered organisms. 25
- Former U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, Dan Glickman

A Short History of Organic Agriculture Regulation

The national organic standards have received much attention in the agricultural arena,
and have been the focus of many debates. Even before the new rules were in place,
genetic engineering was one of the core issues in discussions involving the organic
standards. Although genetic engineering has provoked countless controversies, few
solutions to the challenges genetic engineering poses to organic production and
regulation have surfaced.

Some of the debates around the organic standards focus on whether the organic label is
accurate, whether consumers are getting what they expect and pay for when purchasing
organic products. 26 Those who do not believe the organic label represents their personal
ideals lament that a range of ecological, economic, and social concerns are not addressed
by the NOP. 27 For example, recent reports uncover that labor conditions on large-scale
organic farms are sometimes as bad as conventional operations. 28 One consumer
advocate who pushed Congress to implement the NOP put it this way: “Organic is

25

Food Fight [Electronic version]. (2000, March 7). PBS Online NewsHour, Retrieved on July 12, 2006,
from http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/jan-june00/food_3-7.html
26
Friedland, M. T. (2005). You call that organic? The USDA’s misleading food regulations, 13 N.Y.U.
Envtl. L.J. 379.
27
Guthman, J. (2004). Agrarian Dreams: The Paradox of Organic Farming in California, California: The
University of California.
28
Mark, J. (2006, August 2). Workers on organic farms are treated as poorly as their conventional
counterparts [Electronic version], Grist, Retrieved on August 3, 2006 from
http://www.grist.org/news/maindish/2006/08/02/mark/
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becoming what we hoped it would be an alternative to.” 29 While an analysis of the
accuracy of the label in this context is outside the scope of this paper, understanding
consumers’ perception of the organic label is an essential starting point for any discussion
on the organic standards, as the consumers of organic products are the driving force of
the market, whether the label is accurate or not.

It is clear that consumers who purchase organic foods expect these products be free of
genetically engineered material; therefore, there exists an implied “zero tolerance” for GE
material in organic products. 30 Polls show that the number of consumers who know that
genetically engineered foods cannot be labeled “organic” under the organic standards is
growing. In 2002, two polls showed that 68 percent of consumers who bought organics
agreed they were purchasing products without genetically engineered organisms. 31 In
2003, one of these polls showed that the number had grown to 76 percent. 32

Ironically, as this paper will show, GE material continues to turn up in crops and food
intended for non-GE markets, including organic. Still, little attention has been given to
the role of regulations in the face of GE contamination. The focus of this chapter is to
outline the role of the organic standards and Coordinated Framework in keeping GE
products contained and out of markets where they are not allowed. In chapter three, these
regulatory issues will be fleshed out using the example of RR alfalfa.

The National Organic Program

In just decades, the organic agriculture industry grew from a grassroots movement into a
29

Pollan, M. (2001, May 13). Behind the organic-industrial complex [Electronic version], The New York
Times, Retrieved on July 30, 2006, from http://www.mindfully.org/Food/Organic-Industrial-Complex.htm
30
Ronald, P. & Fouche, B. (2006). Genetic engineering and organic production systems, Retrieved on
August 12, 2006, from www.indica.ucdavis.edu/publication/reference/r0602.pdf
31
Carolyn R. & Grobe, D. (2005). Consumer knowledge and perceptions about organic food [Electronic
version], Journal of Extension, 43(4), Retrieved on October 14, 2005 from
http://www.joe.org/joe/2005august/rb3.shtml; Whole Foods Market. (2003). One year after USDA organic
standards are enacted more Americans are consuming organic food [Electronic version]. Retrieved on
August 14, 2006 from http://www.wholefoods.com/company/pr_10-14-03.html
32
Whole Foods Market. (2003). One year after USDA organic standards are enacted more Americans are
consuming organic food [Electronic version]. Retrieved on August 14, 2006 from
http://www.wholefoods.com/company/pr_10-14-03.html
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$14 billion industry. 33 As the organic industry grew, many believed that this rapid growth
warranted uniform production standards at the federal level. On October 21, 2002, the
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) implemented the country’s first
National Organic Program (NOP). The standards were the product of a decade-long effort
to develop uniform organic production standards, which, in the end, were met with both
praise and apprehension. Proponents of the new rules celebrated a uniform labeling
regime after years of confusion in the marketplace regarding what constituted
“organic.” 34 By contrast, opponents of the rules saw the new government label as a
federal usurpation of the word “organic,” because once the NOP was established, it
became illegal for anyone to label products as “organic” unless he or she was certified
under the federal program.

For decades, organic agriculture was regulated by state and private agencies. The
industry’s growth, however, created confusion in the marketplace, evidence for
mislabeling, and problems with interstate commerce. 35 Members of the organic industry
began petitioning Congress for federal standards that they hoped would reduce consumer
confusion over the various state and private labeling rules. Congress responded. Oregon
Representative Peter DeFazio introduced a bill (H.R. 4165) with the main purpose of
promoting “the production of organically produced foods through the establishment of a
national standard production for organically produced products and providing for the
labeling of organically produced products, and for other purposes”—it had twenty-two
co-sponsors. 36 The staff of Vermont Senator Patrick Leahy ultimately penned the final
act, the Organic Foods Production Act of 1990 (OFPA), which Congress passed as part of
the 1990 Farm Bill. 37

33

Organic Trade Association. (2006, May 7). Organic sales continue to grow at a steady pace [Electronic
version], Retrieved on August 12, 2006, from
http://www.organicnewsroom.com/2006/05/organic_sales_continue_to_grow.html
34
Nichols, A.J. (2003). As the organic food industry gets its house in order, the time has come for national
standards for genetically modified foods, 15 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 277.
35
Friedland, M. T. (2005). You call that organic? The USDA’s misleading food regulations, 13 N.Y.U.
Envtl. L.J. 379; (See note 14)
36
H.R. 4156, Retrieved on June 1, 2006, from http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/D?d101:44:./temp/~bdmssF:
37
Carroll, C. S. (2004). What does organic mean now? Chickens and wild fish are undermining the Organic
Foods Production Act of 1990, 14 S.J. Agri. L. Rev. 117; Clark, J.B. (1995). Impact and Analysis of the
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The National Organic Program: Proposed Rule The Organic Foods Production
Act (OFPA) authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to create a certification program that
would meet the Act’s goals. It would be a “comprehensive statutory and regulatory
framework governing all stages of organic production and handling,” what is now the
NOP. 38 To develop the standards, the Secretary of Agriculture appointed a National
Organic Standards Board (NOSB), which reviewed existing state, foreign, and private
organic certification programs. The NOSB was “to assist in the development of standards
for substances to be used in organic production and to advise the Secretary on any other
aspects of the implementation of [organic certification].” 39 The fifteen NOSB members
represent several categories in agriculture, including: farmer (4), handler/processor (2),
retailer (1), consumer/public interest (3), environmentalist (3), scientist (1), and certifying
agent (1). 40

Significantly, the NOSB was not meant to be just another advisory committee. Many
people were skeptical of the federal government’s ability to draft organic standards that
reflected the inherent values of organic agriculture. In fact, “the organic community
agreed to agree to USDA’s primary role in setting organic standards only if the authority
of USDA was balanced by that of the [NOSB].” 41 Thus, the NOSB was to serve as
USDA’s partnership with the organic community. 42

When OFPA was passed, 21 states already had existing laws regulating organic product
labeling. 43 By the time the National NOP was fully implemented in 2002, the number of

U.S. Federal Organic Food Production Act of 1990 with particular reference to the Great Lakes, 26 U. Tol.
L. Rev. 323.
38
Rawson, J. M. (2005). Organic agriculture in the U.S.: Program and policy issues [Electronic version],
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service,
Retrieved on August 16, 2006, www.fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/57848.pdf
39
7 U.S.C. 6518 (a),(b)
40
7 U.S.C. 6518 (b)
41
Sligh, Michael. 2002. Organics at the crossroads: The past and the future of the organic movement, In
Kimbrell, A. (Ed.), Fatal harvest: The tragedy of industrial agriculture (p. 343). San Francisco, CA: Island
Press.
42
Ibid.
43
Friedland, M. T. (2005). You call that organic? The USDA’s misleading food regulations, 13 N.Y.U.
Envtl. L.J. 379.

10

states had grown to 33. 44 Existing state regulatory frameworks were more stringent than
the proposed rule (especially California), and prohibited genetically engineered products
from products certified as organic. 45 Although USDA reviewed California’s and other
state laws governing organic production, the agency failed to incorporate some of the
most basic tenets of these regulatory frameworks into its proposed rule.

When the USDA published its proposed rule for the NOP in 1997, the rule allowed for
the use of many controversial inputs, including genetically engineered (GE) organisms.
Members of the organic industry, and largely consumers, were outraged by the proposed
rule. To date, the USDA has never received more comments on a proposed rulemaking
than it did on its first proposed NOP rule. 46 The agency received 275,603 comments in
opposition of the rule, most of which abhorred the inclusion of GE organisms on the
National List of Active Synthetic Substances Allowed. 47 When asked in an interview
about the public’s response to the proposed rule, former Secretary of Agriculture Dan
Glickman replied: “There was an absolute firestorm.” 48 Speaking to the more than
270,000 comments, Glickman said: “It was the most this department has ever received on
any rule and maybe one of the most the government has received in modern history.” 49
This large consumer outcry showed how important sound organic principles were to the
public, and that among other controversial practices, genetic engineering held no place in
the organic movement’s collective vision of what constituted an organic production
system.
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The crux of many of the controversies surrounding the proposed rule was that USDA had
ignored many of the NOSB’s recommendations, including the Board’s recommendation
to exclude the “big three,” as they came to be known: genetically engineered organisms,
sewage sludge, and irradiation. 50 In fact, many of the comments “angrily called on the
agency to obey the NOSB.” 51 Today, the USDA continues to be criticized for not
responding to NOSB recommendations. 52

Why was USDA permissive of genetic engineering under the organic standards to begin
with? In an internal memo acquired by Mother Jones magazine, USDA highlights its
concern about excluding genetically engineered material from organics: “The Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service and the Foreign Agricultural Service are concerned that
our trading partners will point to a USDA organic standard that excludes GMOs as
evidence of the Department’s concern about the safety of bioengineered commodities.” 53
Still, USDA could not ignore the huge public response it received against the proposed
rule.

The National Organic Program: The Final Rule In the end, the final rule better
reflected consumer and organic industry preferences. 54 USDA issued new proposed rules
on March 13, 2000, which went through another public comment period. The final rule
was published on December 21, 2000. 55 The NOP became effective on February 21,
2001, but the program itself was not fully implemented until October 21, 2002 (codified
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at 7 C.F.R. 205). 56

In a Research Service Report for Congress, it was clearly stated that the NOP’s purpose is
“to give consumers confidence in the legitimacy of products sold as organic, permit legal
action against those who use the term fraudulently, increase the supply and variety of
available organic products, and facilitate international trade in organic products.” 57
Unlike the OFPA, the final rule provided a definition for “organic production,” defining
it as “a production system that is managed in accordance with the [OFPA] and
regulations in this part to respond to site-specific conditions by integrating cultural,
biological, and mechanical practices that foster cycling of resources, promote ecological
balance, and conserve biodiversity.” 58 (The OFPA only states that “organically
produced” means an agricultural product that is produced and handled in accordance with
this title.) 59

To meet the goals of the OFPA and NOP, USDA accredits private and state certification
agents to oversee compliance with the rules, largely by monitoring a farmer’s “organic
system plan.” The “organic system plan” is “a plan of management of an organic
production or handling operation that has been agreed to by the producer or handler and
the certifying agent and that includes written plans concerning all aspects of agricultural
production or handling,” as described in the act and regulations. 60 Certified organic
producers must submit this plan to their certifying agent for the purpose of creating “a
forum through which the producer or handler and certifying agent collaborate to define,
on a site-specific basis, how to achieve and document compliance with the requirements
of certification.” 61

Most certifying agents are private. As of August 2006, only nineteen states and counties
56
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have established certifying entities. The remaining thirty-six are private companies. 62
These agents visit producers, processors, and handlers to conduct annual reviews of crop
management practices, handling, and inputs, and to verify continued compliance. 63
States are permitted to adopt their own organic labeling requirements with USDA
approval. State requirements must be as or more stringent than USDA standards and are
allowed to label their products with a separate logo in addition to the USDA label (as are
private organic certifying organizations). 64

Perhaps the most important aspect to remember about the NOP is that it provides
production standards only, and does not serve as a certification of the end product. 65 In
the same vein, USDA is clear in pointing out that NOP regulations are not intended to
address food safety or nutrition. In other words, USDA does not claim that organic foods
are more nutritious or safer than conventionally produced foods. 66 Because the
regulations are process-based and not product-based (often referred to as the “processproduct distinction”), 67 they focus on how a product is grown, harvested and prepared,
rather than characteristics of the end product. Interestingly, most of the state laws that
governed organic production before OFPA were not exclusively process-based. 68

How Does the NOP Address Genetic Engineering?

As mentioned earlier, the final rule does not allow for the use of products derived from
genetic engineering in certified organic systems. Section 205.105 of the NOP specifically
62
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prohibits GE crops from certified organic production systems: “To be sold or labeled as
‘100 percent organic’ . . . the product must be produced and handled without the use of
excluded methods. “Excluded methods” are “methods used to genetically modify
organisms or influence their growth and development by means that are not possible
under natural conditions or processes and are not considered compatible with organic
production.” 69 Such methods include “cell fusion, microencapsulation and
macroencapsulation, and recombinant DNA technology (including gene deletion, gene
doubling, introducing a foreign gene, and changing the positions of genes when achieved
by recombinant DNA technology).” 70

The rules extend the prohibition of GE organisms to animal feed by requiring certified
organic livestock be fed certified organic feed: “The producer of an organic livestock
operation must provide livestock with a total feed ration composed of agricultural
products, including pasture and forage, that are organically produced and, if applicable,
organically handled.” 71

The NOP provides strict certification standards that organic farmers must adhere to in
order to label their products as “organic.” On the surface it may seem that the NOP
clearly addresses agricultural biotechnology by not allowing the use of GE seeds and feed
in certified operations. However, as explained below, GE material can enter a farmer’s
field and products through means completely out of the farmer’s control, complicating
the issue of “excluded methods” as they pertain to the NOP. Because genetic engineering
is listed as an “excluded method,” how do the rules address the unwanted and unintended
presence of GE material in organic products?

Genetically Engineered Seeds and Crops: Genetic Drift Organic farmers have
long been concerned with pesticide drift, where residues of chemicals applied in their
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area show up in their organic products. 72 Pesticide drift occurs unavoidably with ground
and aerial methods of pesticide application; in fact, 10 percent to 35 percent of pesticides
applied with ground application equipment misses the target area, and 50 percent to 75
percent of pesticides applied with aircraft misses the target area. 73

Now, in addition to chemicals transported across field borders, organic producers are
experiencing a new drift—“genetic drift”—from neighboring fields. The rules define
“drift” as “the physical movement of prohibited substances from the intended target site
onto an organic operation or portion thereof.” 74 A “prohibited substance” is the use of a
substance “of which in any aspect of organic production or handling is prohibited or not
provided for” in the Act or regulations. 75 Thus, “prohibited substances” include
“excluded methods,” including genetically engineered material.

The transfer of genes from GE crops to organic crops poses many problems to organic
farmers. 76 Should a farmer’s crop acquire unwanted GE material, he or she risks losing
premium prices afforded by organic markets, including organic, as well as export markets
that shun GE crops and food. Farmers also risk losing the genetic integrity of seeds that
took years to develop through careful breeding. The issue of liability associated with
patented genetic traits is of great concern, as companies effectively own crops that
contain their patented traits, even if those traits entered the crop through inadvertent
cross-pollinization, as will be discussed at the end of this paper.

While the NOP prohibits the intentional use of GE material in organic systems, the rules
do not address the unintended presence of GE material—there is no set tolerance for
72
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“contamination” of GE material in organic products. 77 Several countries have set
tolerance levels for GE material in conventional (non-GE) crops and food. These vary
widely, from the European Union (EU) (0.9 percent) and Japan (5 percent). 78 A GE crop
must be approved in the country in order for any level of tolerance to be acceptable. For
example, if a GE corn variety not approved for import by the EU is discovered in a large
shipment of corn that is approved for import, the whole shipment would likely be rejected
because there is zero tolerance for an unapproved GE product.

The organic rules do, however, establish a tolerance level for pesticide residue. “Residue
testing” is defined as “an official or validated analytical procedure that detects, identifies,
and measures the presence of chemical substances, their metabolites, or degradations
products in or on raw or processed agricultural products.” 79 “Tolerance” is “the
maximum legal level of a pesticide chemical residue in or on a raw or processed
agricultural commodity or processed food.” 80 When organic products test for more than 5
percent residue of the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) tolerance for a specific
contaminant, the agricultural product cannot be sold, labeled or represented as organic. 81

Because the regulation does not establish a tolerance or threshold level for GE material in
organic products, the rules governing the exclusion of products exceeding tolerance
levels from organic sale do not apply to GE contamination, as it only applies to
contaminants for which there is an established EPA or FDA tolerance. In the Federal
Register notice announcing the final rule, USDA explains why a tolerance was not
established in response to comments regarding setting a “threshold” for GE material in
organic products:
We do not believe there is sufficient consensus upon which to establish
such a standard at this time. Much of the basic, baseline information
about the prevalence of genetically engineered products in the
conventional agricultural marketplace that would be necessary to set
77
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such a threshold—e.g., the effects of pollen drift where it may be a
factor, the extent of mixing at various points throughout the marketing
chain, the adventitious presence of genetically engineered seed in
nonengineered seed lots—is still largely unknown. Our understanding of
how the use of biotechnology in conventional agricultural production
might affect organic crop production is even less well developed. 82

This response points to a lack of data regarding the presence of transgenes in organic and
conventional fields and products. However, as this paper will show, contamination is a
real threat to many organic producers. USDA’s inaction on the issue proves to be a large
gap in the NOP, especially when farmers can become contaminated via environmental
factors completely out of their control.

GE material can enter a farmer’s field through several routes, unlike pesticide drift,
which is largely attributed to wind. First, transgenic pollen can travel from a neighboring
farm via wind or pollinating insects (i.e. bees). Second, transgenic and conventional seed
can get mixed through shared harvesting and storage equipment. Third, volunteer
plants—crop plants that persist without deliberate cultivation—show up in fields a year
or more after the original crop was grown as a result of seed being shed from the crop and
remaining dormant in the soil. 83 Some volunteer plants germinate several years after the
original seed was shed. 84

Within a farmer’s “organic system plan” are measures to ensure the genetic integrity of
the organic product, including the process for locating commercially available,
organically produced seed. 85 Although it is a general rule that producers must use
organically grown seeds, annual seedlings, and planting stock in their operations, 86 there
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are five exceptions to this rule. 87 If “an equivalent organically produced variety is not
commercially available,” a producer may use nonorganically produced, untreated seeds
and planting stock. 88 This exception does not extend to seeds used for edible sprouts,
such as alfalfa seed used for sprouting. All seeds used for producing edible sprouts under
the NOP must be organically produced. 89 None of the exceptions allow for the use of GE
seeds.

The plan must also include a description of the management practices that a producer or
handler will implement to “prevent commingling of organic and nonorganic products on
a split operation and to prevent contact of organic production and handling operations
and products with prohibited substances.” 90 For example, the NOP requires farms to
“have distinct, defined boundaries and buffer zones such as runoff diversions to prevent
the unintended application of a prohibited substance to the crop or contact with a
prohibited substance applied to adjoining land that is not under organic management.” 91
A “buffer zone” is defined as:
an area located between a certified production operation or portion of a
production operation and an adjacent land area that is not maintained
under organic management. A buffer zone must be sufficient in size or
other features (e.g., windbreaks or a diversion ditch) to prevent the
possibility of unintended contact by prohibited substances applied to
adjacent land areas with an area that is part of a certified operation.92

Even with guidelines to prevent commingling and drift in place, the regulations do not
require mandatory testing of products to ensure these measures are successful. 93 This
differs from many of the state laws that governed organic production before OFPA, as
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many required residue testing. 94 The NOP requires certifiers’ on-site inspections to
verify:
That prohibited substances have not been and are not being applied to the
operation through means which, at the discretion of the certifying agent,
may include the collection and testing of soil; water; waste; seeds; plant
tissue; and plant, animal, and processed products samples. [emphasis
added] 95

Therefore, testing for GE material is not mandatory, even when there is reason to believe
that prohibited substances have entered an organic product:

The Administrator, applicable State organic program’s governing State
official, or the certifying agent may require preharvest or postharvest
testing of any agricultural input used or agricultural product to be sold
[organic] . . . when there is reason to believe that the agricultural input or
product has come into contact with a prohibited substance or has been
produced using excluded methods. [emphasis added] 96

Moreover, testing is unlikely to occur, because: “Such tests must be conducted . . . at the
official’s or certifying agent’s own expense.” [emphasis added] 97

As mentioned above, the NOP does not provide a tolerance level for transgenic material.
Some comments submitted in response to USDA’s proposed rule argued that without a
threshold for GE material in organic products the rules set a “zero tolerance” standard for
contamination. 98 Yet USDA states otherwise:

. . .these regulations do not establish a ‘zero tolerance’ standard. As with
other substances not approved for use in organic production systems, a
positive detection of a product of excluded methods would trigger an
investigation by the certifying agent to determine if a violation of organic
production or handling standards occurred. 99
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If GE material is detected in an organic product, the finding does not automatically point
to a violation of organic standards, as the standards only govern intentional actions, and
the “presence of a detectable residue alone does not necessarily indicate use of a product
of excluded methods that would constitute a violation of the standards.” 100 So, not only is
it unlikely that testing to identify excluded material in organic products will occur, in the
event that contamination is revealed in an organic product, the regulations do not prohibit
this product from being sold as organic.

Still, it might be assumed that organic farmers risk losing certification if residues of an
excluded method turn up in their products. Interestingly, according to a letter from the
USDA to the National Association of State Departments of Agriculture, no farmer has
ever lost certification due to the presence of GE material in his or her certified organic
products. 101 But it is likely that organic producers will have difficulty selling their crops
to non-GE markets if GE material is found in their products. They might be forced to sell
in a conventional market, thus “forfeiting the organic premium price that they would
otherwise have received for their product.” 102

As mentioned before, regulations do not specify a threshold level for the unintended
presence of GE material in an organic product, unlike the tolerance levels set for
pesticide residue. The regulations do not even mention contamination by transgenic
pollen or seed. Because there is no requirement to test for the unwanted presence of
transgenic material, it is highly unlikely that certifiers and/or producers will test products
under the current rule, especially when testing is conducted at the certifying agent’s or
farmer’s own expense. Moreover, there is no EPA tolerance level for the products of
genetic engineering, so “as weak as the USDA production standards are with regard to
pesticide contamination, they are even weaker with regard to biotech contamination—the
regulation do not establish any limit whatsoever on contamination by genetically
100
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engineered materials.” 103 This means the regulations allow a product to be sold as
organic even if contamination is revealed, as long as the producer did not intentionally
use an excluded method.

Of course, organic foods grown and handled according to the NOP will contain less
pesticide residue and GE material than their conventional counterparts, because
producers who adhere to the standards do not intentionally apply pesticides or use GE
seeds or feed. 104 But will consumers tolerate any contamination of their organic food
products? Do they even know that accidental contamination occurs?

Consumer Perception

The organic food industry continues to grow, and remains an alternative to GE
ingredients for many consumers. In 2005, organic foods accounted for the largest share of
the organic industry, with over $13 billion in sales. 105 Sales of organic food in the U.S.
are projected to more than double by 2009. 106 The FDA believes that “the practices and
record keeping that substantiate the ‘certified organic’ statement would be sufficient to
substantiate a claim that a food was not produced using bioengineering.” 107 But GE
material continues to turn up in crops and food intended for non-GE markets, even when
the “food was not produced using bioengineering,” as the FDA statement just read.
Because it is clear that consumers who purchase organic foods expect these products be
free of GE material, there exists an implied “zero tolerance” for GE material in organic
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products. 108 It is unclear whether the organic industry will set a threshold in the future for
GE material in organic foods.

The organic standards remain controversial, and how they are implemented determines
their impact on organic integrity, according to Michael Sligh, founding chair of the
NOSB. 109 Even if a tolerance level is established, testing remains a voluntary tool for
measuring the effectiveness of the NOP. The next chapter reveals a disturbing pattern of
contamination events that threaten the integrity of the organic industry. Because testing is
unlikely to occur, the extent of this contamination is largely unknown, making it difficult
to gauge what a realistic and enforceable tolerance level would be. Furthermore, the
introduction of RR alfalfa creates new challenges to organic producers, as will be
explored in the next chapter. The role of the government in regulating GE plants is
explored next. What responsibility does the federal government and biotechnology
industry share in keeping GE traits contained?

A Short History of Genetically Engineered Crop Regulation

The regulatory framework for GE crops and food differs tremendously from that
governing certified organic production. Although GE crops garnered much controversy
when they were first introduced, and continue to do so today, no new laws were ever
created to regulate the new technology. Instead, a patchwork of approximately a dozen
existing laws, and primarily three agencies, governs the testing and introduction of GE
crops and food.
The framework is outlined below, and includes only those laws and regulations that
govern GE plants. Segregation and containment issues are discussed at the end of this
chapter, including assessments by scientists and government officials of their adequacy in
containing transgenic crops in the environment and marketplace. What we see is a
108
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regulatory system largely dependent upon voluntary compliance and risk assessments
produced by the manufacturers of the products being regulated.
Discussions about risk assessment and regulation of GE organisms began in the 1970s,
but the federal government did not complete the “Coordinated Framework for Regulation
of Biotechnology” (hereinafter the “Coordinated Framework”) until 1986, which was
published by the Office of Science and Technology, and still applies to new agricultural
biotechnology products today. 110 The federal government established a policy to regulate
products of biotechnology based on composition and intended use rather than by the
method used to produce them. 111 Therefore, the regulatory system for GE crops is
product-based, unlike the NOP’s process-based approach.

This policy decision was largely based on scientific reports that concluded the risks posed
by genetically engineered products do not differ in kind from the risks posed by their
conventional counterparts. 112 Specifically, the National Research Council argued
assessment of risks should be based on the nature of the organism and the environment
into which it is introduced, not on the method by which it is produced. 113 Therefore, a
central premise of the Coordinated Framework is that the process of genetic engineering
poses no new unique risks, and should not only be regulated by the same laws as
conventionally produced products, but that these existing laws are adequate. 114 The
adequacy of the Coordinated Framework has been debated since its inception—from
those arguing it is not stringent enough, to those arguing that it over-regulates. 115

Regulatory authority of GE crops and food is primarily given to three federal agencies:
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Environmental Protection Agency
110
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(EPA), and Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Below is an overview of these
agencies’ role in the Coordinated Framework, including the source(s) of their legal
authority and process for regulating GE plants and GE plant-derived food and feed. As
will be discussed, some GE products are regulated by more than one agency. Because no
laws specifically address genetic engineering, and the laws incorporated into the
Coordinated Framework were enacted for other purposes, they are more general in
nature. 116 Furthermore, these agencies have depended on creative interpretations of their
roles and authority to develop regulations and guidelines that apply existing laws to
products derived from genetic engineering. 117

Table 1
Major Laws that Give Federal Agencies Power to Regulate Biotechnology
LAWS & REGULATIONS
The Plant Protection Act
• Gives USDA authority for GE plants, seeds, and other
GE organisms containing genetic material from plant
pests, and prohibits unauthorized movement of plant
pests
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
• Requires all pesticides sold or distributed in the U.S. to
be registered by EPA
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act
• Requires EPA to set pesticide tolerances for all
pesticides used in or on food
• Authorizes FDA to regulate “adulterated foods” and
“food additives,” and to govern food labeling
The National Environmental Policy Act
• Requires all federal agencies to consider the
consequences of their proposed actions on the human
environment prior to making decisions, including
performing Environmental Assessments

AGENCY

CODIFIED

USDA

7 C.F.R.
§340

EPA

FDA, EPA

USDA,
EPA, FDA

40 C.F.R.
§§152 and
174
40 C.F.R.
§§152 and
174
(N/A for
FDA)
40 C.F.R.
§§1501.3;
1508.9
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United States Department of Agriculture

Legal Authority The Plant Protection Act (PPA) of 2000 gives USDA authority
for oversight of GE plants, seeds, and other genetically engineered organisms containing
genetic material from plant pests. 118 The PPA prohibits unauthorized movement of plant
pests or potential plant pests, including plants derived from genetic engineering. 119
Because the PPA was enacted in 2000, on the surface it “appears to deviate from the
trend of regulating biotechnology under ancient statutes.” 120 However, the new law is
basically an amalgamation of older statues. The Federal Plant Pest Act (FPPA) of 1957
and the Plant Quarantine Act (PQA) of 1912 originally governed USDA’s role in
agricultural biotechnology, before repeal by the Agricultural Risk Protection Act
(ARPA), and incorporated into what is now the PPA. 121 The FPPA and PQA were
enacted well before modern biotechnology and were intended to regulate the introduction
of non-native plant species, not GE organisms. 122 USDA developed and still follows
regulations under the FPPA and PQA to review the agricultural safety of GE
organisms, 123 and has not proposed new or different regulations under the PPA,
according to the Office of the Inspector General.124
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Key Roles and Process for Regulation The Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service (APHIS) is the primary entity in USDA that regulates biotechnology. 125 Through
a notification and permit process, APHIS regulates field testing of GE crops in the
environment, interstate movement, and importation of GE organisms. 126 APHIS
considers each GE plant a “regulated article,” and each DNA segment inserted using
rDNA methods an “event.” 127 Most field trials are conducted under APHIS’ notification
system, a streamlined process that replaced the permit process for more than 85 percent
of the crops in field trials, beginning in 1993. 128 In 2004, about 97 percent of the plants in
field trials were regulated under notifications. 129 Permits are now only required for plants
that do not fit the six criteria listed for notifications, such as plants engineered to produce
pharmaceutical proteins or industrial chemicals. 130

Field trials of GE organisms began in 1986, the same year the Coordinated Framework
was published. Before a person or institution (hereinafter “applicant”) can field test a GE
organism, they must notify APHIS of the planting (unless a permit is needed). APHIS is
required to evaluate the notification information and acknowledge within ten days of
receipt that the planting is “appropriate.” 131 Following field tests, applicants can petition
APHIS to obtain a “nonregulated” status for their product. APHIS evaluates petitions
submitted by the applicant of the organism being field tested, and after assessing the
agricultural and environmental safety of the organism, publishes a document explaining
whether the organism poses a plant pest risk or not, as well as an Environmental
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Assessment (EA) that addresses the potential environmental impact of no longer
regulating the organism. 132

If the petition is approved, the product is no longer regulated by APHIS and can be
grown for commercial sale. APHIS no longer has oversight over the deregulated crop,
including requests for new or follow-up testing. 133 APHIS reviews approximately 1,000
field test notifications per year for GE crops. 134 Since 1986, USDA has approved over
10,600 applications for more than 49,300 field sites,135 and has deregulated over 60
different GE crops. 136 The first GE food crop, the Flavr Savr tomato, a variety engineered
to sustain longer shelf life, entered the marketplace in 1994. 137

The Environmental Protection Agency

Legal Authority EPA is charged with the responsibility to regulate the
manufacture, sale, and use of pesticides to ensure that human health and the environment
are protected. 138 The 1947 Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)
and the 1938 Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), both amended most
recently by the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, give EPA authority to regulate
pesticides. 139 FIFRA requires all pesticides sold or distributed in the U.S. to be registered
by EPA, and FFDCA requires EPA to set pesticide tolerances for all pesticides used in or
132
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on food. 140 When first enacted, FIFRA was intended to regulate chemical and biological
substances designed to kill, damage, or repel unwanted organisms, not products derived
from biotechnology. Although FIFRA has been amended several times, one article points
out that it was enacted prior to Watson and Crick’s discovery of the DNA molecule. 141

Key Roles and Process for Regulation Some plants derived from biotechnology
are engineered to produce their own pesticides. EPA refers to these plants as “plant
incorporated protectants.” 142 Early on, EPA exempted plants and microorganisms with
pesticidal properties from FIFRA requirements. 143 However, the pesticidal properties of
the genetic material falls under FIFRA’s definition of a “pesticide.” 144 Therefore, EPA
does not regulate GE plants themselves, only the genetic material inserted into a
pesticide-producing plant, along with the products it produces.

Examples of pesticide-producing (often called insect-resistant) plants include crops
engineered to produce a natural-occurring soil bacterium called Bacillus thuringiensis
(Bt), which creates proteins that are toxic to certain insects, so that the entire plant
effectively becomes a living insecticide. 145 Bt crops are some of the most frequently
deregulated crop varieties in the United States, including Bt cotton and corn. 146

Pursuant to the FFDCA, EPA establishes a “tolerance” for the allowable amount of
pesticide residue on food products. 147 All pesticide-producing plants are exempt from
tolerance level requirements. 148 The regulation “eliminates the need to establish a
140
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maximum permissible level for residues of this plant-pesticides in or on all raw
agricultural commodities,” 149 because “there is a reasonable certainty that no harm will
result from aggregate exposure to the U.S. population.” 150

The Food and Drug Administration

Legal Authority FDA’s statutory authority for regulating genetically engineered
food stems from the 1938 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA). 151 There are
no statutory provisions for food derived from genetic engineering, and FDA has never
promulgated regulations that expressly cover genetically engineered food. 152 Coupled
with FDA’s largely voluntary approach to regulating genetically engineered food, FDA
arguably practices the least amount of oversight over agricultural biotechnology products.

Key Roles and Process for Regulation FDA is responsible for ensuring the safety
and proper labeling of plant-derived foods and feeds, including those that have been
genetically engineered. 153 FDA is authorized under the FFDCA to regulate “adulterated
foods,” food that “bears or contains any poisonous or deleterious substance which may
render it injurious to health.” 154 FDA also regulates “food additives,” which is any
substance intended to become a component, or affecting the characteristics, of any
food. 155 A “food additive” requires FDA approval unless deemed “generally recognized
as safe” (GRAS). 156 Notably, the manufacturer of a “food additive,” of a GE ingredient,
makes an “independent determination” as to whether the substance is GRAS. 157
Moreover, manufacturers are not required to report a GRAS determination. 158 The FDA
has never formally “approved” a GE food or feed as safe to eat; it has only determined
149
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them to be similar to their conventional counterparts.159 Therefore, FDA has decided that
most components of food derived from genetic engineering (both the inserted gene into a
GE plant and the product itself) do not need approval: “In most cases, the substances
expected to become components of food as a result of genetic modification of a plant will
be the same as or substantially similar to substances commonly found in food, such as
proteins, fats and oils, and carbohydrates.” 160

Critics of FDA’s policy argue that the differences between a GE food and its
conventional counterpart have never been defined, and view the concept of “substantial
equivalence” as being a barrier to research into potential risks of eating GE foods. 161
According to one source, there is but one somewhat official definition of “substantial
equivalence,” that by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD): “The concept of substantial equivalence embodies the idea that existing
organisms used as food, or as a source of food, can be used as the basis for comparison
when assessing the safety of human consumption of a food or food component that has
been modified or is new.” 162 Using this definition, GE food “can be characterized as
substantially equivalent to its natural antecedent, it can be assumed to pose no new health
risks and hence to be acceptable for commercial use.” 163
FDA also has authority over food labeling, 164 but stands by its product-based policy that
GE foods must only be labeled if they differ “significantly” from their conventional
counterparts. A change is “significant” when there is an alteration of the nutritional
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content of the food or if a potential allergen is present. 165 Because FDA believes GE food
does not differ from conventional food, labeling of GE foods is not required. 166

Consumers and food industry players alike have expressed concern about FDA’s
voluntary approach to regulating genetically engineered food. In response, FDA proposed
an amendment to its voluntary consultation policy in 2001. 167 To date, the new rule has
not been finalized. Therefore, it is up to the applicant to decide whether to notify FDA
prior to putting GE foods and animal feeds on the market. Those who do notify FDA
before a new GE ingredient is placed on the market go through a consultation with the
agency, after which FDA publishes a memo. 168 Although “FDA believes that, to date, all
developers of bioengineered foods commercially marketed in the United States have
consulted with the agency prior to marketing the food,” 169 developers of a new GE food
could legally place it on the market without FDA’s knowledge. 170 FDA does not require
mandatory safety testing for GE foods either, 171 and has only conducted one safety
review for a GE food: the first deregulated food product mentioned earlier, the Flavr Savr
tomato. 172

The National Environmental Policy Act

All three agencies are subject to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), a law
that requires all federal agencies to consider the consequences of their proposed actions
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on the human environment prior to making decisions. 173 NEPA provides procedures for
environmental review, which comes into play for some agency decisions regarding
agricultural biotechnology, especially the USDA. 174 For example, APHIS’
Environmental Assessments stem from NEPA process, and are used to determine whether
a full Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is required.175

Segregation and Containment Measures

Segregation The U.S. currently does not require the segregation of GE crops
from non-GE crops in the food supply chain, but may propose a system in the future. 176
As will be explained in the following chapter, segregating GE and non-GE crops,
including organic, has proven extremely difficult, and has proven to be an expensive
process—both to establish segregation measures and to fix mistakes involving unintended
mixing of GE and non-GE products. Segregating GE and non-GE products throughout
the planting, processing, transportation, and exporting stages is a complicated and
expensive procedure. As illustrated by Dr. Susan Harlander, former vice president of
Pillsbury Company: a food company can have more than 6,000 products that contain
8,000 ingredients from 1,000 suppliers that move through 30 processing plants on their
way to being exported to as many as 100 countries. 177 The presence of unapproved
varieties of GE crops in the food system poses even greater challenges. According to
some experts, “it may be simply impossible to prevent all mixing and thus ensure the
regular absence of unapproved transformation events,” especially in the case of crops that
cross-pollinate. 178
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Containment Efforts to keep GE products segregated from non-GE products begin
in the field. Institutions that submit notifications to APHIS for field trials are required to
follow performance standards, including important containment measures for reducing
the crops’ effect on the environment and surrounding crops. Some of the performance
standards that must be met for introductions under the notification procedure include: 179

1. Regulated plants or plant material must be shipped in such a way that the viable
plant material is unlikely to be disseminated while in transit and must be
maintained at the destination facility in such a way that there is no release into the
environment.
2. Regulated plants released into the environment must be planted in such a way that
they are not inadvertently mixed with non-regulated plant materials of any species
that are not part of the environmental release.
3. Regulated plants and plant parts must be maintained in such a way that the
identity of all material is known while it is in use, and the plant parts must be
contained or devitalized when no longer in use.
4. The field trial must be conducted such that the regulated article will not persist in
the environment, and no offspring can be produced that could persist in the
environment.
5. Upon termination of the field test no viable material shall remain which is likely
to volunteer in subsequent seasons, or volunteers shall be managed to prevent
persistence in the environment.
As for permits, “conditions” are set for anyone issued a permit to “prevent the
dissemination and establishment of plant pests.” 180 Not surprisingly, many of the
conditions under permits overlap with the performance standards required for
notifications; however, permits require more government involvement and stricter
containment and disposal measures. For example, anyone issued a permit must submit a
field test report within six months after the termination of the field test, including an
analysis of all deleterious effects on plants, nontarget organisms, or the environment. 181
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While APHIS gives recommendations on how to meet the performance standards, the
instructions are very general in nature and may not appropriately address each new GE
plant, including GE alfalfa. 182 They are also not legally binding. 183 Ultimately, it is the
duty of the “applicant” for each regulated planting of genetically engineered plants “to
determine the specific procedures that will need to be used to meet the performance
standards and to certify that those standards are being met.” 184 Once deregulated, there
are no restrictions imposed on the commercial planting of herbicide-tolerant plants, and
further testing cannot be requested. USDA does not have the authority to require farmers
who plant RR seeds to create refuge or buffer areas to avoid cross-pollination with
neighbors’ crops or surrounding weeds.

Oversight of Field Trials

Noncompliance with performance standards or permit conditions can involve a variety of
infractions, including incorrect isolation distances or planting without a current permit. 185
According to APHIS, 76 percent of all potential compliance infractions between 1990
and 2001 were actual infractions, and only 12 percent were deemed violations and
referred to APHIS’ Investigative and Enforcement Services unit. 186

Although APHIS claims that only two percent of the field tests (in their 1990 – 2001
investigation) resulted in potential compliance infractions, 187 a recent audit report from
the USDA Office of Inspector General concluded that APHIS’ current regulations,
policies, and procedures do not go far enough to ensure the safe introduction of
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agricultural biotechnology. 188 Specifically, the audit found that before APHIS approves
field trials, it does not review the containment protocols, which explain how the
notification applicant will contain the GE crop to prevent it from persisting in the
environment. 189 This is especially disconcerting in light of the fact that the vast majority
of field tests are authorized under the notification process (close to 100 percent).
Moreover, as the audit reports:

APHIS does not thoroughly document its reviews of applications in the
official files. Specifically, APHIS biotechnologists do not sufficiently
document their review process and scientific basis for approving initial
field test applications. APHIS also does not effectively track information
required during the field tests, including approved applicants’ progress
reports, which should contain the results of field tests, including any
harmful effects on the environment. Although we noted that many permit
and notification holders submit these required progress reports late or not
at all, APHIS does not always follow up to obtain the information. 190

Not only does APHIS “lack basic information about the field test sites it approves and is
responsible for monitoring, including where and how the crops are being grown, and
what becomes of them at the end of the field test, the precise locations of all GE field test
sites planted in the US are not always known.” 191 As far as inspections go, APHIS does
not keep track of the total number of inspections completed, and the audit found that the
agency “continued to lack an effective, comprehensive management information system
to account for all inspections and their outcomes.” 192

Other reports call for improvement of agency oversight regarding field trials as well. The
National Research Council concluded that because no single “bioconfinement” 193 method
is likely to be 100 percent effective, developers should create a redundant system by
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using more than one method of containment. 194 The report calls for additional research to
improve both containment methods and public confidence in regulation. 195 In addition,
the committee determined that methods for detecting and culling GE organisms after they
escaped “bioconfinement” are limited. 196 An earlier report by the National Research
Council recommends that the process for testing and deregulating GE crops “be made
significantly more transparent and rigorous” to improve public involvement with policy
development and decision making, as well as enhance scientific peer review. 197

Consumers’ Perceptions of Genetic Engineering

Similar to the regulation and marketing of organic products, consumers’ perceptions play
an important role in the regulation of genetically engineered food. Next to ensuring the
safety of products, the Coordinated Framework was developed to instill public
confidence in the regulation of GE crops and food. 198 As shown, the system is
problematic, and, as a result, consumers’ perceptions of GE food are influencing the
direction of research and development in biotechnology. 199 Significantly, they have been
a primary factor in halting the marketing of several new GE foods. 200
194
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In general, some consumers do not favor the introduction of GE foods, 201 and believe that
laws regulating biotechnology are needed. 202 Results from a 2004 Pew Initiative on Food
and Agriculture poll show that 40 percent of participants said there is “too little”
regulation of GE food; 47 percent are opposed to introducing GE foods into the U.S. food
supply; 27 percent believe GE foods are “basically unsafe;” and over 90 percent think GE
foods should be labeled. 203 Polls also indicate that consumers are willing to pay more for
food that is not genetically engineered. A USDA study showed that in general consumers
discount GE food “by an average of 14 percent.” 204 U.S. consumers are willing to pay
an extra two to three dollars per pound for beef that is from cattle not fed GE feed. 205
And other polls show that consumers are willing to pay 5 percent more for non-GE
potatoes. 206
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Since the introduction of genetically engineered food, several labeling initiatives have
failed, both at the state and federal level. 207 In 2005, however, Alaska became the first
state to pass legislation specific to labeling genetically engineered food, requiring the
labeling of genetically engineered fish sold in the state. 208 (The FDA is currently
reviewing a petition for genetically engineered salmon.) 209 The most recent push for
mandatory labeling is the “Genetically Engineered Food Right to Know Act of 2006”
(H.R. 5269), introduced by Ohio Representative Dennis Kucinich, a long-time proponent
of mandatory labeling and more rigorous regulation of GE crops and food. 210

Summary

Unlike organic production, the introduction of GE crops and food in the U.S. came
without any new statute to regulate these products in the environment and marketplace,
and address potential environmental and human health risks associated with the new
technology. Instead, the government continues to rely on a patchwork of existing and
often outdated statutes, including those governing plant pests, pesticides, and food.
Experts agree that the mix of rules and laws has proved confusing, and, in particular, do
not afford proper oversight for environmental risks associated with GE organisms. 211
Specifically, U.S. regulation of agricultural biotechnology research continues to rely
more on “voluntary reporting and professional norms than on stringent government
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regulation.” 212 Regarding consumers, polls consistently show that choice regarding GE
foods is wanted in the marketplace, and that non-GE foods are growing in demand.

Neither the NOP nor the Coordinated Framework directly address the consequences of
genetic drift. Specifically, no planting restrictions are placed on growers of deregulated
GE crops to mitigate gene flow, leaving the burden to protect organic products from
unwanted transgenic material on the shoulders of organic farmers. Even if containment
measures are taken, they are not 100 percent effective. As documented by various reports,
APHIS’ oversight of regulated plants in field trials is not adequate for protecting the
environment and non-GE crops from the introduction of genetically engineered plants.

In the next chapter, I will apply these frameworks to the case of Roundup Ready alfalfa,
including a description of the regulatory process that Monsanto and Forage Genetics
International followed to get the genetically engineered variety deregulated. I will also
explain some potential implications of introducing this variety into the environment and
marketplace, paying close attention to important issues identified in this first chapter.
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2.
ROUNDUP READY ALFALFA: THE FIRST GENETICALLY ENGINEERED
PERENNIAL FIELD CROP HITS THE MARKET
Once [Roundup Ready alfalfa] is in the environment, it’s there—it will get
in everything. Alfalfa as we know it will be gone forever. 213
- Phillip Geertson, Oregon alfalfa seed producer and lead
plaintiff in RR alfalfa lawsuit

To fully understand how the Coordinated Framework works it is useful to examine it in
the context of one particular genetically engineered (GE) crop. Thus, this chapter
analyzes the case of Roundup Ready (RR) alfalfa by first describing the regulatory
process that Monsanto and Forage Genetics went through to introduce it. Then, I explain
the potential implications of introducing RR alfalfa, focusing on effects to the organic
industry. Although some of these implications have been mentioned in public comments
submitted in response to Monsanto’s petition and a lawsuit against the USDA for
deregulating RR alfalfa, to the best of my knowledge, there has not been an effort to
comprehensively examine the implications of introducing RR alfalfa for the organic
industry.

History of Roundup Ready Alfalfa

RR soybeans entered the market in 1996, followed by RR canola, corn, potatoes, and
cotton. Although farmers have used glyphosate since the 1970s, RR crops allow farmers
to apply Roundup (or other glyphosate herbicides) in an unprecedented manner: directly
over their crops to control certain weeds and unwanted grasses without damaging
harvests—hence the name, the crops are “ready” for Roundup. 214 As mentioned earlier,
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RR crops continue to be readily adopted, and now claim over 100 million acres across the
American landscape. 215

The most recent RR crop to enter fields is alfalfa, produced by the Monsanto Company in
partnership with the largest alfalfa seed producer, Forage Genetics International (a
subsidiary of Land O’Lakes). The events (J101 and J163) used in RR alfalfa are tolerant
to glyphosate, the active ingredient in Monsanto’s trademark herbicide, Roundup. RR
alfalfa is the first genetically engineered perennial plant to be commercialized for
widespread planting in the United States. 216

Alfalfa (Medicago sativa L.) is the most important forage crop in the U.S., and is grown
throughout the nation, covering over 22 million acres in 2006. 217 It is the third most
economically valuable crop to U.S. agriculture. 218 Alfalfa is an important animal feed
because of its high protein and low fiber content, and is a staple of most livestock diets,
especially dairy cows. 219 Because of alfalfa’s pervasiveness throughout the nation, and
because it is typically grown as a perennial crop, it provides important habitat for
wildlife, including migratory birds and endangered species. 220 For all these reasons, it is
dubbed the “Queen of Forages.” 221

Monsanto incorporated the gene sequence (CP4 EPSPS) from a native soil
microorganism, Agrobacterium, into the alfalfa genome to confer resistance to
215
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glyphosate. 222 Glyphosate acts on various enzyme systems and inhibits amino acid
metabolism in what is known as the shikimic acid pathway. 223 RR alfalfa plants, on the
other hand, actually survive glyphosate applications, because the biosynthesis of aromatic
amino acids is maintained by the continued action of the CP4 EPSPS enzyme in the
presence of glyphosate. 224

Dairy producers will be the likely adopters of RR alfalfa, because they often depend on
pure alfalfa stands free of weeds and grasses, whereas beef cattle producers and horse
owners typically feed their animals an alfalfa-grass mixed hay. 225 RR alfalfa is not useful
to mixed stands, as applications of Roundup kill the desired grasses. The majority of U.S.
alfalfa acreage is planted to pure stands (40 percent), whereas a quarter is planted with
grasses or another companion crop. 226

Regulatory Process Leading to the Commercialization of Roundup Ready Alfalfa

The path of RR alfalfa from field trials initiated in 1998 to approval for moving the crop
into the marketplace in 2005 involved several key steps, reviewed below and summarized
in Table 2. What we see is a governmental process that posed few serious hurdles along
the way for Monsanto; yet, one that was also clearly discomforting to many observers of
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that process, resulting ultimately in a lawsuit challenging many of the government’s
assumptions and findings.

Field Trials Under APHIS’ notification program, Monsanto applied for over 300
glyphosate-tolerant alfalfa field trial permits throughout the U.S. between 1998 and
2005. 227 According to the Information Systems for Biotechnology database, only seven
of these notifications were either withdrawn or denied. 228 The average acreage of these
field trials was 435 acres. 229 It is difficult to determine the total acreage and locations of
these field trials, because both notifications and permits list the amount of proposed
acreage for the entire notification or permit, and not the particular states where the trials
take place. Therefore, it is impossible to estimate the amount of acreage proposed for a
particular state when multiple states are listed under a single notification. Also, according
to Neil Hoffman, Director of the Regulatory Division for APHIS, the amount of acreage
proposed usually exceeds the amount planted. 230

It is also difficult to determine if Monsanto and Forage Genetics met the performance
standards outlined in the previous chapter (7 C.F.R. 340.3(c)), as there is no record of RR
field trial inspections in Monsanto’s petition or APHIS’ Environmental Assessment (EA),
and little record of the containment protocol used for the field trials. 231 The only
containment measure mentioned in the companies’ petition is the use of different
equipment for harvesting RR alfalfa from that used for harvesting conventional alfalfa. 232
That said, Forage Genetics did conduct two groups of studies that measured the distance
227
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leafcutter and honey bees transfer pollen from RR alfalfa plants to surrounding
conventional plants. 233 These trials were conducted to gain a better understanding of
alfalfa pollen flow, and to determine suggested isolation standards for minimizing the
spread of the RR trait in commercial scale plantings. 234 Yet there is little evidence that
isolation distances were implemented for RR alfalfa field trials in general. A sentence in
the Federal Register notice advising the public of RR alfalfa’s deregulation status
mentions that field trials “were conducted under conditions of reproductive and physical
confinement or isolation.” 235

Petition for Deregulation It took four years for Monsanto and Forage Genetics to
complete the regulatory process that eventually brought RR alfalfa to the marketplace. In
2002, the two companies began preparing its petition to APHIS for the deregulation of
RR alfalfa, beginning with the EPA. Monsanto first submitted glyphosate residue data
and proposed labeling for the use of Roundup herbicide over the top of RR alfalfa,
pursuant to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). 236
Subsequently, Monsanto submitted a petition for “Reduced Risk” status for review of the
data, which EPA granted on July 23, 2002. 237 The “Reduced Risk” status allows for a
fast-track review of the use of glyphosate in conjunction with RR alfalfa. 238
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On April 17, 2002, EPA issued a notice in the Federal Register that, pursuant to the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), Monsanto had petitioned the agency to
establish tolerances for glyphosate residues on alfalfa. 239 Pursuant to section 408(d) of
the FFDCA, EPA established a tolerance for residues of glyphosate “in or on animal feed,
nongrass, group” at 400 parts per million (ppm), and “in or on grass forage, fodder and
hay, group” at 300 ppm. 240 Because these tolerances did not extend to alfalfa seed,
Monsanto petitioned EPA again to fill this regulatory gap. 241 Monsanto further proposed
to delete the tolerances for alfalfa forage and hay, as the company believed these
tolerances were no longer needed. 242 These tolerances were to apply to both conventional
and genetically engineered alfalfa. 243 Three months later, EPA denied Monsanto’s
request to eliminate the tolerances for alfalfa forage and alfalfa hay.244 Because EPA
previously established an exemption for the CP4 EPSPS protein and the genetic material
necessary for the production of this protein in all raw agricultural commodities, it was
unnecessary for Monsanto and Forage Genetics to acquire an exemption or tolerance for
this protein. 245

In accordance with FDA’s policy statement concerning the regulation of genetically
engineered food and feed products, 246 Monsanto voluntarily submitted a food and feed
safety and nutritional assessment summary for events J101 and J163 in October 2003. 247
Although FDA published an overview of the data submitted by Monsanto (discussed
below), the actual data submitted to FDA is only available to the public through a
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Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. 248 At this time, Monsanto also made
submissions for regulatory import and production approvals to several countries,
including Canada, Mexico, Japan, Taiwan, and Korea. 249

On November 24, 2004, USDA published a notice in the Federal Register announcing
that Monsanto and Forage Genetics had submitted their petition to deregulate RR alfalfa
and that APHIS’ preliminary EA was available for public comment. 250 The public
comment period was set to end on January 24, 2005, but was later extended to February
17, 2005. 251

The next month, FDA issued its Biotechnology Consultation Note regarding RR
alfalfa. 252 The Note summarizes Monsanto’s food and feed safety and nutritional
assessment documents. Because FDA neither conducted independent tests, nor required
mandatory food safety testing, its opinion on RR alfalfa is based on Monsanto’s own
determination that Roundup Ready alfalfa is not materially different from conventional
alfalfa:

Monsanto and Forage Genetics have concluded that their glyphosatetolerant alfalfa event J101 and event J163, and the feeds and foods
derived from them, are not materially different in safety, composition, or
any other relevant parameter from alfalfa now grown, marketed, and
consumed. At this time, based on Monsanto’s and Forage Genetics’
description of its data and information, the Agency considers this
consultation on alfalfa event J101 and event J163 to be complete. 253
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By 2005, it seemed that Monsanto and Forage Genetics had few hurdles left in its path to
achieving nonregulated status for RR alfalfa. EPA set a tolerance level of 0.5 ppm for
glyphosate residue on alfalfa seed in February, the final decision the agency would make
in the approval process. 254 Though not mandatory, FDA had reviewed a summary of the
companies’ data on RR alfalfa’s food and feed characteristics. The petition was still
pending through APHIS, but evidence pointed toward an approval that year, including
several articles in agricultural media. 255

Thus, people following RR alfalfa’s development were not surprised when USDA
announced its decision to deregulate RR alfalfa in May 2005, paving the way for the crop
to move into the marketplace. The requirements pertaining to regulated articles under 7
C.F.R. 340 no longer applied to the genetically engineered alfalfa variety or its
progeny. 256 APHIS published its Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI), which
concluded that alfalfa events J101 and J163 “would not present a risk of plant pest
introduction or dissemination,” and that the events “will not harm threatened or
endangered species or organisms that are beneficial to agriculture; and. . .should not
reduce the ability to control pests and weeds in alfalfa or other crops.” 257 A FONSI
indicates that the agency does not need to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS). 258 Perhaps this is not surprising: there has never been an EIS performed for any of
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the GE crops on the market (although one is currently underway for RR creeping
bentgrass).

Table 2
Regulatory Process Leading Up to the Commercialization of Roundup Ready Alfalfa
RR field trials alfalfa begin
May 2, 1998
April 17, 2002

September 27, 2002

October 2003
August 18, 2004

November 10, 2004
November 24, 2004

February 3, 2005
December 8, 2004
February 16, 2005
May 2005
June 27, 2005

EPA issues a notice in the Federal Register that Monsanto had petitioned
EPA pursuant to the FDCA to establish tolerances for glyphosate residues
related to alfalfa.
EPA establishes “tolerances for residues of glyphosate in or on animal feed,
nongrass group; grass, forage, fodder and hay, group and adds potassium salt
of glyphosate to the tolerance expression.”
Monsanto submits a food and feed safety and nutritional assessment summary
for events J101 and J163 in October 2003
EPA issues a notice in the Federal Register that Monsanto had petitioned
EPA pursuant to the FDCA to establish tolerances for residues of glyphosate
for alfalfa seed. Monsanto also petitions to eliminate the tolerances set for
alfalfa, forage, and alfalfa hay because they were allegedly no longer needed.
EPA denies Monsanto’s request to eliminate the tolerances for alfalfa forage
and alfalfa hay.
USDA publishes a notice in the Federal Register announcing the
Monsanto/Forage Genetic International’s petition to deregulate genetically
engineered alfalfa and that the Environmental Assessment (EA) is available
for public comment due by January 24, 2005
Comment period is extended through February 17, 2005
FDA issues a Biotechnology Consultation Note to the File BNF No. 000084
regarding Glyphosate-tolerant Alfalfa Event J101 and Event J163
EPA sets a tolerance level of 0.5 ppm for alfalfa seed codified at 40 CFR §
180.364(a)
USDA issues an Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant
Impact (FONSI)
USDA publishes notice in Federal Register advising the public of its
determination that glyphosate-tolerant alfalfa events J101 and J163 are no
longer considered regulated articles.
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Public Response By the close of the RR alfalfa comment period, APHIS had
received a strong response: 663 comments. 259 According to the Federal Register,
comments came from alfalfa growers and seed producers, organic growers, animal
producers, growers associations, consumer groups, agriculture industries, university
professionals, and private citizens. 260 The vast majority of respondents (520) did not
support deregulating RR alfalfa, while 137 supported the petition. 261 The main concerns
raised by the opposition included market acceptance and cross-pollination between RR
and organic alfalfa varieties. 262 The concerns, however, went unheeded by APHIS.

After USDA gave Monsanto and Forage Genetics a green light to commercialize RR
alfalfa, a coalition of alfalfa producers and non-governmental organizations filed a
lawsuit against the agency on five claims, including violations of the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and the
Endangered Species Act (ESA). It is the first lawsuit to be filed against USDA in
response to the deregulation of a particular GE crop. The plaintiffs argue that RR alfalfa
will affect the integrity of organic products, creating marketing and liability problems; it
will introduce more herbicides into the environment and create Roundup-resistant weeds;
and it will damage export markets. The suit was filed in federal court in the Northern
District of California, and asks USDA to rescind its decision to deregulate RR alfalfa and
perform a full EIS. It also asks for an EPA consultation with U.S. Fish and Wildlife about
the potential for RR alfalfa to affect endangered or threatened species and their
habitats. 263 The case is still pending.
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Potential Implications of Introducing Roundup Ready Alfalfa into the Marketplace and
Environment
The lawsuit highlights various problems with the regulatory process involving RR alfalfa,
but also implications to the organic industry. Since the introduction of RR crops,
scientists, public interest groups, and farm organizations have raised concerns regarding
their impact on the environment, human health, and the marketplace. Experience with RR
soybeans, corn, canola, and cotton show that herbicide-tolerant crops are considerably
different than their conventional counterparts (despite the regulatory assumption that they
are not). Indeed, RR crops have posed new agronomic, economic, and environmental
challenges to U.S. farmers. The introduction of RR alfalfa raises similar concerns as past
crops, but also new risks emerge because of its perennial nature and ability to crosspollinate with crop and weed relatives. These concerns are explored below, including
herbicide use trends and glyphosate-resistant weeds, contamination and market
acceptance.

Environmental and Agronomic Concerns

Increased Herbicide Use and Weed Resistance RR crops have been rapidly
adopted; for example, in 2006, 89 percent of soybeans planted in the U.S. were an
herbicide-tolerant variety. Indeed, Roundup use alone has grown by an estimated 700
percent with the introduction of herbicide-tolerant crops. 264 Suggested application rates
of glyphosate have increased by 50 to 200 percent, largely attributed to the growing
resistance in weeds. 265
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Cline, H. (2005, March 5). Glyphosate resistance new concern [Electronic version], Western Farm
Press, Retrieved on August 14, 2006, from
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years [Electronic version], Biotech InfoNet, Retrieved on July 1, 2006, from www.biotech-info.net
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Glyphosate-resistant weeds are now the bane of many farmers’ operations, as farmers
must resort to more toxic and costly chemicals to control resistant weeds.266 Farmers
must now contend with so-called “superweeds,” a weed that survives a normal dose of a
chemical application that previously would have killed it. 267 Weeds develop resistance
for several reasons, including: frequent exposure to a particular chemical, the spread of
naturally resistant weed seeds, and the outcrossing of herbicide-tolerant genes from GE
plants to weedy relatives.

This issue of increased pesticide use and resistance is obviously of concern for
conventional farmers, but for organic farmers these issues raise additional concerns, such
as pesticide drift. An increase in herbicide use is likely to cause more herbicides to enter
the environment, and spraying causes chemicals to drift, at times fairly far from the
targeted organism, as mentioned in the last chapter. Additionally, the development of
weed resistance to particular herbicides, especially glyphosate, has encouraged the use of
more toxic chemicals to control resistant weeds.

RR alfalfa enters the marketplace at a time when several cases of weed resistance to
glyphosate have been reported. For example, glyphosate-resistant horseweed (Conyza
canadensis), or marestail, has infested a half-million acres since it first showed up in
2003, and may have cost Arkansas farmers as much as $500 million in inputs in 2005. 268
Glyphosate-resistant horseweed has been documented in California, Delaware, Kentucky,
Indiana and Ohio. Similarly, glyphosate-resistant Palmer amaranth (Amaranthus
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James, L. (2005, July 21). Resistant weeds could be costly [Electronic version], Delta Farm Press,
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palmeri), or pigweed, was discovered in Georgia in 2005. 269 The weeds survived a
dosage of glyphosate almost ten times the recommended rate. 270 In Missouri, scientists
have since found glyphosate-resistant pigweed that survives eight times the suggested
dose of glyphosate. 271 Even the most intensive control mechanisms for these weeds seem
to fail. 272

These weeds develop in fields where farmers consistently grow RR crops. 273 Therefore,
introducing another crop into the RR line is likely to further compound these problems of
weeds’ resistance to glyphosate, and lead to higher input costs for farmers and higher
chemical concentrations in our environment and food. Furthermore, many farmers who
produce alfalfa have traditionally used few if any herbicides. Although more recent
figures are not available, in 1998 a University of Wisconsin weed control specialist
reported that herbicides are applied to less than 17 percent of U.S. alfalfa hay acreage. 274
Providing the option of spraying herbicides directly over alfalfa is likely to increase the
amount of chemicals used in alfalfa production. In fact, the National Center for Food and
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Agriculture Policy estimates that RR alfalfa could result in the application of 200,000
pounds more herbicides per year in California alone. 275
Weed specialists identified weed resistance in RR alfalfa field trials years before the
variety was approved for commercial sale. A University of California-Davis weed
specialist observed a shift in the prevalence of a weed in experimental plots where RR
alfalfa had been grown and sprayed for three years: “When we started this study, there
were four or five stinging nettle plants on [one] end of the field. . .Now you can see nettle
all along the field. We’re seeing more and more nettle each year.” 276 There is also
evidence that glyphosate may not kill bermudagrass at the proposed labeled rates for
weed control in RR alfalfa. 277 Additional weeds found in alfalfa stands appear to be
developing resistance too, including lambsquarter and barnyardgrass. 278 Farmers who
adopt RR alfalfa will rely on additional herbicides whether Roundup-resistant weeds
surface or not, because Roundup is weak on some of the most important alfalfa weeds,
including malva, nettle, henbit, cheeseweed, marestail, hairy fleabane and filaree. 279

At the end of an alfalfa stand’s life (anywhere from three to twelve years), many farmers
use Roundup to kill remaining plants in order to proceed with crop rotations. 280
Alternatives for taking out RR alfalfa stands are often more toxic than glyphosate
herbicides, such as 2,4-D and Dicamba. 281 According to Cornell University’s
Environmental Impact Quotient (EIQ), a system that rates pesticides’ effect on the
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environment, Dicamba has an EIQ of approximately 28, almost twice that of
glyphosate. 282

Evidence for increased herbicide use and a reliance on more toxic chemicals to control
resistant weeds points to more chemicals entering the environment and food system.
Organic farmers have dealt with pesticide drift for decades, and chemical residues
continue to show up in certified organic products. An increase in herbicide use poses
another challenge to protecting the integrity of organic products. Coupled with genetic
drift, it seems that the integrity of organic agriculture is at the whim of the wind. Of
course, then there are pollinators.

Gene Flow

Alfalfa seed producers rely on pollinators, especially leafcutter and honey bees, to
pollinate their alfalfa plants in order to yield a large amount of seed. Cross-pollinization
occurs when bees collect pollen for food, “and in doing they transfer some pollen from
the flowers of one plant to the flowers of another,” a process “necessary” for setting seed
in alfalfa. 283 When bees transfer pollen from one crop to the next, genetic material is
sometimes transported as well. Thus, gene flow is a concern for organic farmers who
need to avoid the presence of transgenes in their crops and products. Both commercial
and wild pollinators contribute to gene flow in agricultural fields, including to wild
relatives, such as volunteer alfalfa (seeds that germinate late, often a year or more after
they are sown) that becomes established on the edges of fields and along roads. Feral RR
alfalfa plants that are not harvested will go to seed, becoming vehicles for gene flow.

Gene Flow: Crop-to-Wild Volunteer alfalfa may present serious problems in
managing unwanted alfalfa plants, including limiting yields of crops succeeding an
282
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alfalfa stand. 284 All alfalfa has a certain percentage of “hard seed” content. “Hard seeds”
are viable, but have an impervious seed coat that keeps water from entering the seed to
start germination. 285 Therefore, they germinate late in the season or even years later,
sometimes leading to volunteer alfalfa plants. These volunteer and feral crop populations
“can act as potential sources for the reintroduction of transgenes,” 286 complicating
control measures for pollen flow to surrounding alfalfa fields and feral alfalfa. Some RR
alfalfa field trials averaged 43 to 71 percent hard seed content. 287

According to Norman Ellstrand, a leading expert on plant genetics at the University of
California, Riverside, “some cultivated plants volunteer after cultivation. . . founding
feral populations that create problems. . .In some cases, the tendency to found feral
populations could increase as the result of acquiring new traits.” 288 That is, transgenic
crops might evolve into a more aggressive plant. 289 Volunteer RR alfalfa will be
especially problematic when RR alfalfa is rotated with other RR crops, such as RR
corn. 290 County crews also use Roundup to control feral alfalfa along roadsides and in
ditches. 291 If RR alfalfa outcrosses with feral alfalfa, Roundup will be ineffective on feral
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alfalfa plants that have received the tolerance trait from surrounding RR alfalfa plants. 292
Even if the probability of problems due to gene flow in RR alfalfa is low, managing the
problems can be costly. 293 Ellstrand believes that the majority of herbicide-tolerant plants
are “apt to give a weed a fitness boost in certain environments,” and his studies confirm
that cultivated plants will hybridize with their wild relatives when grown in close
proximity. 294 A report by the Ecological Society of America concludes, “Currently, it is
not possible to prevent gene flow between sexually compatible species that inhabit the
same region because pollen and seeds disperse too easily and too far to make complete
reproductive confinement practical.” 295

The case of RR creeping bentgrass may be instructive. A recent study shows that RR
creeping bentgrass pollen (a popular golf course and lawn turf grass) escaped from field
trials and hybridized with wild relatives over two miles from the test plot. 296 These
findings follow an earlier EPA study that confirmed RR bentgrass pollen had traveled to
plants of the same species in different test plots thirteen miles away. As a result of this
first study, USDA decided to perform the first EIS ever to be conducted on a genetically
engineered plant. Both the U.S. Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management fear that
RR creeping bentgrass will outcross the herbicide tolerant trait to its wild relatives (of
which there are 23 in the U.S.), precluding the agencies from controlling unwanted
bentgrass with their current herbicide of choice: glyphosate. 297 Additionally, RR creeping
292
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bentgrass is planted in field trials covering thousands of acres, making the findings
mentioned above especially alarming. 298

Gene Flow: Crop-to-crop Evidence shows that crop-to-crop movement of
transgenic traits is likely, even more likely than crop-to-wild movement. 299 Still, “the
ecological and evolutionary consequences of crop-to-crop gene flow are just beginning to
be investigated.” 300 What we do know is that “it is easy to lose track of transgenic
genes,” and as Ellstrand explains:

Different varieties of the same crop are usually fully sexually
compatible. It is not unusual for adjacent and simultaneously flowering
fields of the same crop to cross-pollinate. Also, gene flow by seed
becomes an issue in this context. Unless very carefully segregated, seed
from different varieties often becomes mixed during seed production. If a
seed bank persists in the soil, individuals from last year’s planting can
appear within this year’s crop. 301

“Genetic pollution” occurs when transgenic traits make it into crops intended for markets
that aim to meet a particular level of purity, such as organic crops. 302 Unlike the presence
of a pesticide, a single crop has the opportunity to multiply itself, whereas a chemical
molecule remains a single molecule or breaks down into metabolites. 303 Unwanted genes
in plants increase their numbers through reproduction, complicating attempts to recall or
contain the genes. 304 If transgene flow is maintained “from a large source population,”
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the extent these traits spread could be great, including the “potential to persist indefinitely
in cultivated or free-living populations .” 305

Canada’s experience with transgenic canola is an example of how extensive hybridization
between crops can be. After planting three different varieties of herbicide-tolerant canola,
Canadian growers now find that canola plants volunteering in subsequent seasons are
resistant to three herbicides owned by different companies (each of the three herbicides
for which the different varieties were individually engineered to tolerate, including
glyphosate). This rampant spread of transgenic canola traits makes controlling volunteer
canola extremely difficult. It has also negatively impacted markets that shun genetic
engineering, as nearly 75 percent of Canadian canola is exported each year. 306 For
example, the European Union (EU) export market for Canadian canola was $425 million
in 1994, but is now “virtually zero” because of the EU’s opposition to GE products,
according to a report by the Standing Committee on Agriculture and Forestry in
Canada. 307 Many also argue that GE canola has destroyed the Canadian organic market.
As will be shown, the contamination of organic and other non-GE products continues to
be a problem in an age where two agricultural industries are growing, quite literally, sideby-side.

Market Concerns & Contamination

Biological factors and human error both contribute to the unwanted spread of transgenic
pollen and seed. Such contamination is problematic not only ecologically, but also in
terms of differentiation in the marketplace. Although biotechnology corporations believe
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“co-existence” is a reality, keeping transgenic and conventional products separate
throughout the food supply chain has proven more than difficult—some argue it is
impossible. Many ecologists believe that “strict confinement of [genetically engineered
organisms] is often impossible after large-scale field releases have occurred.” 308 Others
assert that genetic drift is inevitable. Scientists from Santa Clara University and the
University of Manitoba recently concluded that the movement of transgenes beyond their
intended destination is a “virtual certainty.” 309

As GE crops continue to be readily adopted, contamination events involving organic and
other non-GE crops ensue. A recent report published by two public interest groups
documented 88 cases of GE contamination in 39 countries on five continents. 310
Although most of these contamination cases are not fully investigated, cross-pollination
appears to be a cause in the majority of cases. 311 Not only can GE seeds get mixed with
non-GE seeds at any stage of production, farmers often unknowingly plant seeds that,
while not a GE variety, contain GE material—ensuring a contaminated harvest from the
beginning. The Union of Concerned Scientists tested samples of conventional varieties of
corn, soybeans, and canola, and concluded that the varieties are pervasively contaminated
with low levels of DNA sequences derived from GE varieties. 312 The report notes that
foundation seed of traditional crop varieties used for breeding—seeds with no detectable
level of GE contamination—need protection for future research and market demands. 313
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Even seed industries question whether current foundation seed varieties can meet a one
percent purity level.314

But seed industries have done little to slow contamination or educate their farming
customers. For instance, Genetic ID, a GE organism testing facility based in Fairfield, IA,
tested five different conventional seed varieties from four major seed companies, and
found that all the varieties of supposedly non-GE seeds from each company tested
positive for a small percentage of GE material. 315 As a result, GE crops continue to turn
up in fields that farmers believe are completely free of GE crops, and, consequently, in
markets that do not want GE food, such as organic markets and some export markets. 316

Cross-pollination, impure seeds, and the convoluted path seeds travel through—from
farm fields to grain elevators and transport trucks, to ocean barges and food companies—
are not the only routes to contamination. At times, it is the companies’ own
mismanagement of genetic resources. In 2004, Syngenta, one of the largest agricultural
biotechnology companies, reported an error in GE corn breeding to U.S. authorities. 317
For three years, Syngenta inadvertently produced and distributed a GE corn variety that
did not have regulatory approval. 318 As a result, several hundred tons were grown and
distributed in the U.S., most likely exported to other countries, and used in field trials in
Spain. 319 Syngenta believes that the unapproved corn variety was mistakenly used in
breeding. 320 Similarly, in 2003, University of California-Davis scientists mistakenly sent
314
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GE tomato seeds to researchers at twelve institutions in the U.S. and to researchers in
fourteen countries. 321 Apparently, the UC-Davis scientists were unaware the seeds
contained genes derived from genetic engineering. Seminis Seed, the company UC-Davis
scientists originally obtained the seeds from, was fined for sending the seeds without
correct documentation. 322

While numerous contamination events have been documented around the world, no event
has received more public attention than the discovery of Aventis’ StarLink corn in the
human food supply—a variety not approved for human consumption. In 1999, Iowa
farmers planted less than 0.4 percent of their corn to StarLink. 323 By harvest time, half
the harvests registered positive for the GE variety. 324

After this discovery, seed companies, farmers, processors and food makers spent more
than one billion dollars trying to eradicate Starlink. 325 Three years after StarLink was
found in the food supply and pulled from the market, contaminated grain still pervaded
the nation’s corn supply. 326 In 2003, Aventis agreed to pay $110 million to settle claims
from corn growers who did not grow StarLink but were hurt by the declining market for
U.S. corn because of the contamination. 327 Neil E. Harl, a professor of economics at Iowa
State University, estimates that Aventis has paid out more than $500 million to farmers,
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food processors and grain handlers. 328 Experts agree that it will take years to remove
StarLink from the human food supply. 329

Tests Reveal Widespread Contamination in Organic Food Products As explained
in chapter one, the National Organic Program (NOP) provides production standards for
organic crops (and processed products) only, and testing for unwanted genetic material is
not required for organic crops. Because the government has never required testing, many
farmers and consumer and environmental groups have investigated the extent of GE
contamination in conventional seeds. 330 For example, StarLink was discovered in the
food supply after a coalition of non-governmental organizations tested corn taco shells
for GE material. 331 (StarLink corn was the last transgenic crop variety to receive “split
approval”—approval for animal feed but not human consumption.) Since this finding,
several contamination events have been revealed across the country. 332 Because organic
farmers depend on organic seed varieties (or conventional varieties if particular organic
varieties are not available) to meet organic standards and consumer demand, seed
contamination places an unfair burden on organic producers by hindering their ability to
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find GE-free seed. 333 Some U.S. organic farmers now import seeds from as far as China
to ensure seed purity. 334

Organic grower David Vetter in Nebraska has tested his seeds regularly since 1997, and
discovered contamination of his corn harvest in 2000. 335 Because he confirmed the purity
of his seeds before planting, Vetter attributes the contamination to cross-pollination with
GE corn in neighbors’ fields. 336 Vetter tests his seeds because seed dealers will not
guarantee the purity—some refuse to test their seeds. 337 Consequently, farmers shoulder
the cost of testing if they want to guarantee their crops as GE-free. These tests add about
25 percent to Vetter's corn seed bill.338 He spent $450 on the tests that revealed the
contamination of his corn crop and $1,500 to evaluate a load of corn worth $4,000. 339
While he bears the costs, he has little recourse, save going to the court for damages—
something that has not been done by an organic farmer in the U.S.

Illinois-based Clarkson Grain Company takes strict identity preservation measures to
ensure its crops are non-GE, and uses an optical scanner to sort through conventional and
organic blue and white corn varieties. 340 Despite these precautions, GE material still
contaminates about six percent of Clarkson’s grain. Clarkson describes GE crops as a
“leaky technology” and says contamination limits his market, especially abroad, where
some countries have zero tolerance for GE material in organic products. 341
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Most recently, a GE rice variety not approved for commercial use (only approved for
field trials) showed up in the U.S. rice supply, half of which is exported.342 Fearing the
same thing could happen to them, India’s lead exporters and farmers unions are asking
their government to terminate all GE rice field trials in order to protect their markets.
Rice receives a good price on the export market, and growers fear that countries that
doubt India’s non-GE status will begin testing or rejecting shipments. 343 Research on the
unapproved herbicide-tolerant rice variety, produced by Bayer CropScience of Germany,
was abandoned in 2001. Margaret Mellon of the Union of Concerned Scientists says the
situation offers “more evidence. . .that all of these things that have been getting tested
ultimately have a route to the food supply.” 344

Is Organic Alfalfa at Risk?

If RR alfalfa makes its way into the organic alfalfa market, organic alfalfa farmers risk
serious consequences: costly eradication efforts and potential loss of market; loss of
consumer confidence and higher prices for consumers; and loss of genetic resources used
in organic and conventional alfalfa seed breeding. Alfalfa is insect-pollinated, primarily
by bees; therefore, markets for alfalfa seed and hay that shun or outright reject GE
material in seeds and feed risk contamination by RR alfalfa. 345 Considering alfalfa’s
importance to the organic livestock industry, contamination concerns cannot be
overlooked.
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Under the NOP, organic livestock must be fed certified organic feed. Milk cows
accounted for over half of the total number of certified animals in 2003. 346 The total
number of certified organic livestock, including beef cattle, pigs, sheep and lambs,
increased by 572 percent between 1997 and 2003. 347 And the demand for alfalfa-derived
organic products appears to be growing. For example, in 2005, California experienced a
shortage in organic feed, and is looking to North Dakota to increase production of
organic grain and forage, including alfalfa. 348 California currently has to import organic
feed from China and South America to meet its rapidly growing demand for organic
livestock and poultry markets. 349 The U.S. also recently experienced a shortage in
organic milk, one of the fastest growing segments of the organic market. 350 In fact,
organic milk is one of the first organic products a consumer is likely to purchase, and has
been called a “gateway to organic food.” 351 While the shortage was mostly attributed to a
lack of certified organic cows, this demand is implicitly coupled with a need for more
organic alfalfa hay. 352

Pollen drift between RR alfalfa and conventional alfalfa was recorded in field trials years
before the new forage hit the market. Researchers at Kansas State University sstudied
alfalfa pollen drift and found that complete containment of transgenes within alfalfa seed
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or hay production fields would be unlikely using current production practices. 353 And a
market researcher and promoter of RR alfalfa at Washington State University believes
that it is difficult to certify that non-GE alfalfa will not be contaminated if grown in an
area where GE alfalfa cultivars are produced. 354

Even manufacturers and proponents of RR technology acknowledge the unintended
spread of engineered traits. Monsanto’s 2007 Technology Use Guide outlines factors that
contribute to cross-pollination but does not require preventative measures for mitigating
the transfer of the GE trait:

Roundup Ready Alfalfa should be managed for high quality hay/forage
production including timely cutting to promote high forage quality and to
prevent seed development. In geographies where conventional common
alfalfa seed production is intermingled with forage production and the
agronomic conditions (climate and water/irrigation availability) are such
that forage alfalfa is allowed to stand and flower late in the season,
Roundup Ready Alfalfa must be harvested at or before 10 percent bloom
to minimize potential pollen flow from hay to common alfalfa seed
production. 355

Because the NOP does not allow GE material in certified organic farming systems, crosspollination of RR alfalfa with organic crops could increase production costs, reduce
profits, or even eliminate markets for organic alfalfa producers. These markets afford
organic alfalfa producers a ten to fifty percent premium for their hay compared to nonorganic producers, and are a viable means to making farming profitable. 356 USDA does
not have rules in place that require farmers who plant RR seeds to create refuge or buffer
areas to avoid cross-pollination with neighbors’ crops or surrounding weeds. As
explained in chapter one, the burden of keeping “excluded” material out of certified
353
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organic fields is on the organic producer, not the neighbor planting GE crops, and not the
patent owner of the escaped GE trait (in this case, Monsanto).

Still, Monsanto argues that alfalfa hay fields will not significantly contribute to gene
flow. 357 Monsanto spokesperson Mica DeLong said that:
Farmers’ concerns about cross-contamination are unfounded because the
only way alfalfa can go to seed is if farmers let it, and farmers using
Monsanto’s Roundup Ready products sign a licensing agreement
precluding them from saving and replanting the seeds. . .since the
majority of growers produce Roundup Ready alfalfa only for hay, animal
feed or exports, growers would not allow their crops to go to seed
because that would reduce the quality of the forage. 358

DeLong’s statement is misleading and over-simplified, as alfalfa farmers cannot control
weather or other factors contributing to their harvest schedule. Just because a farmer
signs a contract acknowledging recommended growing practices, there is no legal
requirement for farmers to harvest hay at a certain time, or to ensure that their fields are
isolated from alfalfa fields grown for seed production (where fields go to full bloom in
order to set seed). If RR alfalfa becomes well established in the environment and
marketplace, organic and conventional alfalfa seed may start testing positive for
transgenic material, as the Union of Concerned Scientists discovered in the conventional
corn, soybean and canola supply. According to one expert on RR alfalfa, the “most likely
contamination could be in purchased seed because of seed production practices that may
not allow adequate isolation distances.” 359 Hay producers typically harvest before alfalfa
blooms or at a very small percentage bloom (extension literature often recommends 10
percent bloom). 360 Opponents of RR alfalfa insist that most alfalfa hay is cut after flowers
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have already produced viable pollen. 361 Therefore, while cross-pollination between hay
fields is less of a concern than between alfalfa seed production fields, it is nevertheless a
valid concern for alfalfa producers who want to avoid RR alfalfa.

Of course, pollen does not stop at national borders either. Although RR alfalfa is
currently approved for import in Canada (not for planting), the company acknowledges
that cross-pollination can happen across the border. As one Monsanto spokesperson
explains:
The company had to take into account the possibility that circumstances
beyond its control could lead to the GM alfalfa crossing into Canada
once it was released to growers in the U.S. That could happen through
illegal shipments of seed into Canada or through insects such as bees
carrying pollen from Roundup Ready alfalfa fields near the border.
Cross-pollination with non-GM alfalfa crops could result. It's a plant, so
we're going to have some possibility for movement. 362

Should RR alfalfa in the U.S. contaminate Canadian alfalfa, or if RR alfalfa is approved
for planting in Canada, sources of non-GE alfalfa seed for U.S. organic alfalfa producers
may further be limited. Experts agree that more needs to be written about the effects of
crop-to-crop gene flow, especially in light of recent contamination events. 363

Export Markets

Even though RR alfalfa is only approved for commercial use in the U.S., it may cause
controversy in countries that do not share a North American border. Both organic farmers
and conventional farmers who export (especially to sensitive markets) rely on seeds and
harvests that are free of transgenic material. Farmers who export to countries that shun
GE crops and food are just as concerned as organic farmers about their ability to provide
361
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a GE-free product. There was much contention around the introduction of RR alfalfa in
areas where alfalfa is largely produced for export, because both alfalfa farmers and export
businesses knew the nature of alfalfa—its ability to cross-pollinate with other varieties—
did not bode well for an industry that depends on foreign customers who are wary of
accepting GE products.

Nearly all alfalfa exported from the U.S. is grown in the western U.S. Ninety-five percent
of U.S. alfalfa is kept for use as animal feed; the balance is exported. Japan accounts for
75 percent of the export market (around $500 million a year), and the rest goes to South
Korea, Taiwan, Mexico, and Canada. 364 Even though Monsanto and Forage Genetics
have received approval from most of these governments, many U.S. export companies
and producers insist their customers do not want it. 365 As one market researcher put it,
“the issues are more of a concern with the customer than with government approval.
Most of the alfalfa hay customers have indicated a low tolerance for GMOs in hay
products.” 366 Several alfalfa export companies submitted comments to APHIS in
opposition to RR alfalfa for this reason. 367 The contention around RR alfalfa in the
context of exports was also documented in the media. Mark Anderson of Anderson Hay
and Grain Inc., one of the largest hay exporting companies in the U.S., stated that he did
not want RR alfalfa because of the politics and problems that go with it. 368 Jeff Plourd of
El Toro Export in El Centro, CA is quoted: “Some of our Japanese hay customers are
asking us to sign documents saying no genetically modified products will be coming
364
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over.” 369 Many alfalfa processors and exporters have indicated that their Japanese
customers do not want GE material in their forage products. 370 So, regardless of any
tolerance level set by the government (Japan has a 5 percent tolerance for GE material in
non-GE products), customers may continue to demand zero tolerance for GE alfalfa.

Significantly, the Washington State Hay Growers Association took a strong stance
against the immediate release of RR alfalfa. 371 The Association asked that Monsanto and
Forage Genetics hold off on selling RR alfalfa in Washington until its foreign customers
were willing to accept the technology. 372 Still, Monsanto and Forage Genetics insisted on
moving forward with sales in some parts of the state, causing tension between the two
stakeholders, and increasing fears among exporters that their markets in the Pacific Rim
would be lost. 373 Hay is the largest export commodity by volume in the Pacific
Northwest, and Columbia Basin growers export about $140 million in alfalfa to Japan
each year. 374 Growers fear that Japanese customers will stop purchasing all U.S. alfalfa
out of contamination fears, a case similar to the beef embargos imposed by Japan in 2003
and 2006 in response to Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), or mad cow disease,
as well as Japan’s response to the prospect of GE wheat, a response that ultimately gave
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Monsanto little choice but to pull its petition for the deregulation of RR wheat from
APHIS. 375

Clearly, the issue of acceptance of GE crops by export markets looms large. When RR
alfalfa was first deregulated—approved for commercial sales and planting—some of the
most important export countries had not yet approved the transgenic forage for import.
Therefore, Monsanto implemented a “Limited Domestic Launch,” which was an
additional contract that RR alfalfa growers had to sign (in addition to the Technology
Agreement). Simply put, it stated that RR alfalfa was to be grown for domestic use only,
pending international market approval. In February 2006, Monsanto and Forage Genetics
removed the domestic use requirements after receiving final import approval from some
important export markets. 376

Notably, certified organic producers and hay exporters may not be the only ones avoiding
RR alfalfa. Some “natural” beef producers who prefer non-GE feed are currently unable
to purchase grain with any guarantee that it does not contain GE traits. 377 If RR alfalfa is
widely adopted, and follows the precedent of RR soybeans, corn, and canola, non-GE
options will be limited if not impossible to find for farmers and ranchers committed to
non-GE seed and feed sources. 378 Furthermore, in the event of organic alfalfa hay
shortages, consumers can expect prices of organic meat and dairy products to increase.

Sprout Industry

Consumers may also be concerned about the potential for RR alfalfa to enter another
market that it is not intended for: sprouts. Alfalfa sprouts are a popular item in health
375
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food stores because of their many nutritional benefits. 379 Monsanto states in its 2007
Technology Use Guide that RR alfalfa seed may not be planted for the production of
sprouts, 380 despite that it has been approved for human food use. 381 RR alfalfa seed may
impact the sprouting industry despite not being marketed directly to sprout growers. This
is because the introduction of RR alfalfa into the environment and marketplace may
eventually limit seed sources. Sprout producers who wish to maintain GE-free will find it
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to locate pure seed sources in the future should RR
alfalfa be widely adopted. This is especially alarming for producers who market or are
considering marketing their sprouts as organic or GE-free. Many large food retail chains,
including Trader Joe’s, Wild Oats, and Whole Foods, are committed to keeping GE
ingredients off their shelves. As these markets continue to grow, sprout growers should
be aware of the difficulty and added costs (testing for transgenic material in their
products) of providing sprouts that are GE-free. Woodward points out that sprout
producers, as well as producers who provide alfalfa for natural supplement companies,
are not likely to know that RR alfalfa is on the market, and may impact their production
and processing operations. In his words: “It is questionable if the health or sprout market
knows that an alfalfa GMO will be on the market and that they might have to test for its
presence.” 382

Honey Industry

The honey industry is another stakeholder in the alfalfa industry, as honey bees are an
important pollinator of alfalfa, and most U.S. honey is produced from an alfalfa or clover
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floral source. Honey producers risk losing markets that demand honey free of transgenic
traits. Honey bees can transfer pollen several miles, and could cross-pollinate RR alfalfa
with conventional varieties. Between 1998 and 2000, honey exported to the EU from
Canada dropped by five million dollars (55 percent) because of traces of RR canola. At
the time, transgenic canola was not approved in the EU. It is important to note that
Monsanto and Forage Genetics are not seeking EU approval for RR alfalfa, meaning that
any trace of the transgenic forage in food products will be deemed illegal and refused.

Importantly, the NOP does not specifically address certification of honey. In 2004, the
Policy Development Committee recommended to the NOSB that apiculture operations be
certified organic and that the NOP “should proceed with rulemaking, using
recommendations submitted by NOSB to construct proposed rule amendments.” 383 These
rules were recommended because of the unique practices involved in apiculture. Such
rules are not yet in place, though honey is technically covered by the NOP. There is a
growing market for certified organic honey, according to a report by the Saskatchewan
Agriculture, Food, and Rural Revitalization Department. The report also notes that issues
involving GE organisms “continue to be a concern for many honey producers who export
to certain markets.” 384 Although testing for transgenic material is not mandatory under
the NOP, countries that import U.S. honey may test products, especially in light of RR
alfalfa’s introduction, as the EU did years ago with Canadian honey imports.

Summary

Evidence for pollen drift confirms certified organic alfalfa hay and seed producers’
concern that containing the RR alfalfa trait may be extremely difficult. 385 Of course, this
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perspective neglects the issue of alfalfa sprouts. Even with demonstrated gene flow
between alfalfa varieties, proponents do not expect much resistance from consumers,
because alfalfa is “one step removed” from the food product.386 Still, opponents view RR
alfalfa’s release as a silent introduction of a new GE ingredient into the food system, and,
in addition to market risks for farmers, fear negative environmental consequences, such
as an increase in herbicide use. 387 Because GE food, and food derived from GE feed, is
not labeled in the United States, consumers are left to make the connection from field to
plate—from those hay bales that dot the rural landscape to their glass of milk, slab of
butter and cheese, beef steak, honey, and many other livestock products.

It is clear that the introduction of RR alfalfa into the marketplace has caused controversy
among farmers and consumers alike, and may create similar problems as its RR
predecessors: an increase in herbicide use and glyphosate-resistant weeds, market
rejection and cross-contamination. Keeping organic products free of GE material has
proven difficult, and appears to be a hefty burden for organic producers who struggle to
ensure the genetic purity of their seeds and harvests.

Organic alfalfa is an important component to the organic livestock industry, an industry
that continues to grow each year. Evidence for the likely transfer of transgenic alfalfa
traits into surrounding fields indicates that organic alfalfa producers will face new
challenges in ensuring organic alfalfa products free of GE material. Export producers are
also likely to face market challenges, as Japanese customers have already expressed a
desire for U.S. forage to remain GE-free. The introduction of RR alfalfa may also impact
the alfalfa sprout market and honey producers seeking non-GE status.

So, are the existing regulatory frameworks with respect to agricultural biotechnology and
the National Organic Program sufficient for protecting the integrity of organic food in the
face of genetically engineered crops? Given the potential impacts of introducing RR
386
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alfalfa, I will analyze and assess whether existing regulations are sufficient for protecting
the integrity of organic alfalfa in the next chapter.

76

3.
LIVING TECHNOLOGIES IN AGRICULTURE
They've introduced technology that they can't manage and now I have to
pay the bills.
-David Vetter, Organic Farmer in Nebraska 388
As examined in the last chapter, there are several potential implications of introducing
RR alfalfa that make it a good case study for evaluating the effectiveness of current
regulatory frameworks. Specifically, are they adequate to protect the integrity of organic
alfalfa in the face of RR alfalfa? Alfalfa is an important component of the organic
industry, and the demand for organic alfalfa continues to increase each year. The extent
of the contamination of non-GE feed sources, primarily corn, canola, and soybeans, is
deeply problematic, and the introduction of RR alfalfa may further limit non-GE seed and
feed options should conventional varieties become contaminated. Focusing on the issue
of genetic drift, this chapter points out weaknesses in the National Organic Program
(NOP) and Coordinated Framework that may allow RR alfalfa to enter the organic
marketplace, and further evaluates additional issues pertinent to the integrity of organic
alfalfa products.

The National Organic Program: The Burden of Avoiding a Living Technology
Genetic engineering has been a core issue in organic agriculture discussions for decades;
yet, as mentioned in chapter one, few solutions to the challenges genetic engineering
poses to organic production and regulation have surfaced. An obvious weakness of the
NOP in regards to genetic engineering—to “excluded methods” in general—is the lack of
mandatory testing of both seeds and harvests. Because USDA’s intentions were to create
process-based standards, the agency argues that mandatory testing for transgenic material
in certified organic products would signify a product-based standard. 389 Moreover, in the
event transgenic material is identified USDA goes further to allow the excluded
substance in organic products as long as the production standards were followed, and the
388
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excluded material was not intentionally used: the “presence of a detectable residue alone
does not necessarily indicate use of a product of excluded methods that would constitute
a violation of the standards.” 390 In response to public comments concerning transgenic
pollen drift, USDA stated that:

The emphasis and basis of these standards is on process, not product. We
have specifically structured the provisions relating to excluded methods
to refer to the use of methods. [Prohibiting] the products of excluded
methods. . .would not be consistent with this approach to organic
standards as a process-based system. 391

It may not be surprising that USDA discourages testing, as the agency initially rejected
residue standards in general, even for pesticides on organic foods. 392 Although consumers
tend to demand zero tolerance of transgenic material in organic products, the standards do
not establish or address a limit for the unintended presence of this material. Interestingly,
the Organic Foods Production Act (OFPA) was intended to “require periodic residue
testing by certifying agents of agricultural products that have been produced on certified
organic farms and handled through certified organic handling operations,” 393 and is not
exclusively process-based. 394 A Senate Report on the Act indicates that Congress may
have intended for the NOP to monitor the effectiveness of the standards. The report
explains that farmers “may produce products with minimum residues due to inadvertent
environmental contamination such as drift from a neighboring farm” even if the organic
standards are strictly followed. 395 The report also notes that organic food is not
necessarily residue-free, but that “residue testing plays an important role in organic
certification.” 396
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The Senate Report indicates that testing serves as a check on “the honesty of the system,”
and a way to ensure that consumers are getting what they pay for: “This legislation
provides that if prohibited materials are present at levels that are greater than the
unavoidable residual environmental contamination. . .then such food shall not be labeled
organically produced.” 397 While Congress may have thought the residue testing
requirement in OFPA would enforce both process standards and product standards, the
“current NOP regulations serve neither, as the regulations do not require any form of
random or periodic residue testing.” 398

The nature of pollen drift makes regulating transgenic material extremely difficult.
Farmers and certifying agents cannot identify transgenic material that has become
integrated within a plant without testing. But there are several reasons why testing is
unlikely to happen. First, certifiers and farmers are unlikely to know if transgenic pollen
has entered a field and product, unless they are aware of farming neighbors who grow
transgenic crops that easily cross-pollinate. Second, the regulations read that testing
“may” occur only if “there is reason to believe” that a farmer has violated his/her plan.
Third, because certifying agents are hired by farmers, there is competition with other
certifiers and therefore pressure to keep costs down; meaning, “agents risk losing clients
to less strict certifiers if they impose burdens on farmers not required by law.” 399 Fourth,
the cost of testing falls on the shoulders of certifying agents (if they request testing) or
farmers (if they want to investigate the genetic content of seeds or harvests). And people
in the organic industry may, rightly, feel that it is not their responsibility to test when the
risks are posed by others. Lastly, there is no real incentive for farmers to test their organic
products, because these products can still be sold as organic even if they include
transgenic material, as long as the farmer did not intentionally use transgenic seeds.
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Contaminated Products are Entering the Market

Because USDA does not require planting restrictions on herbicide-tolerant crops—such
as isolation distances to mitigate gene flow to non-GE crops—the onus of protecting
organic plants is on the organic producer. Even with biological barriers in place, organic
farmers simply cannot control the movement of transgenic material by pollinators and
wind, and certainly cannot control the genetic content of organic and conventional seed
that may contain traces of transgenic material without their knowledge. The nature of
alfalfa lends itself to the argument that RR alfalfa will end up in markets where it is not
allowed. To review, alfalfa is pollinated by insects, commercially by bees that can carry
pollen for miles, especially honey bees. Alfalfa is also a perennial crop with a certain
percentage of “hard seed,” seeds that germinate in succeeding seasons, sometimes a year
or more later. Controlling 100 percent of volunteer alfalfa resulting from hard seeds,
especially on a large acreage, is unrealistic, just as unrealistic as the argument that every
farmer growing RR alfalfa will harvest each plant before viable pollen is formed. For the
reasons identified in the last chapter, and reviewed above, it is likely that RR alfalfa will
make its way into the organic market.

A clear pattern of contamination has been documented for many RR crops during the last
decade. Consumers’ knowledge of this problem is largely unknown, though sources point
to a limited awareness (or awareness that it is a problem of the future). 400 Still, few
solutions to ensure the integrity of organic products have been identified, perhaps for the
following reasons. For one, biotechnology companies claim there is a successful “coexistence” between transgenic and conventional crops (including organic), so efforts to
continue containment should be minimal. Secondly, both industries arguably depend on
consumers’ lack of knowledge about transgenic content in organic products. As attorney
Michelle Friedland points out:

Although it may seem as if the interests of the organic industry and the
biotech food industry would be entirely in opposition to each other,
400
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because the availability of organic food likely reduces political
opposition to biotech foods, the existence of the organic food industry
and the public belief that organic foods are free of biotech products
actually benefits the biotech industry. . .The biotech industry certainly
does not want to tell consumers that organic food does not actually offer
a complete alternative to biotech products. 401

The organic industry also has an incentive to fuel—or at least ignore—consumer
misperceptions about organic food, to support the belief that organic is a true (perhaps
“pure”) alternative to food derived from biotechnology. Thus, the NOP regulations place
organic farmers in an “awkward position.” 402 Because regulations essentially allow
contaminated products to be sold as organic:

Organic farmers who refuse to knowingly sell contaminated crops, or
who paid for expensive testing of their crops to ensure that they did not
do so, would be at a competitive disadvantage to organic farmers who
merely complied with the NOP regulations’ requirements. Moreover,
because consumers do not understand that the regulations allow
contaminated crops to be sold as organic, and because this lack of
understanding increases demand for organic food, organic farmers also
have incentive to maintain consumers’ misperceptions about organic
food.

Nevertheless, many organic farmers are genuinely concerned about the product their
consumers are receiving, the integrity of organic seeds, and the rampant spread of
transgenic material. Some producers frequently test their own products to identify
contamination, not because it is required by their certifying agent or food processor, but
because of their efforts to “save organics.” 403
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When contamination is detected, organic producers are left with the burden of eradicating
the excluded material from their field. In the instance of contamination by RR alfalfa,
removing all the material will prove to be a difficult task, if not impossible, as seeds can
lay dormant in the ground until the following growing season (or even later), and
volunteer alfalfa cannot be readily identified as transgenic. Implementing more stringent
biological barriers, as well as fronting the cost of testing harvests, will be costly. 404

The Tolerance Debate

A position paper on co-existence, authored by the International Federation of Organic
Agriculture Movements (IFOAM) European Union Group, states that organic
certification currently has zero tolerance for contamination by genetically engineered
material. 405 Even though consumers of organic products expect this zero tolerance, there
continues to be a debate around whether a tolerance for transgenic material should be
established in the U.S. USDA says the NOP does not establish zero tolerance for
transgenic material, though the rules imply a zero tolerance by including genetic
engineering as an excluded method. Some seed industries do not favor setting a tolerance
either. The American Seed Trade Association says that a tolerance of “zero is not
possible” and is against setting a tolerance for transgenic material in organic products. 406
In countries where tolerance levels are established, such as the EU (0.9 percent), IFOAM
takes a strong stance on the definition of a tolerance level, asserting that these levels
“indicate the maximum tolerance for exceptional and unforeseeable contamination
events, not for permanent levels of contamination.” 407
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The tolerance debate is complex. On one hand, a tolerance level for contamination by
transgenic material might be a good idea. Curiously, while there is a limit to how much
pesticide contamination can be in an organic product, there is no allowable limit as to the
amount of transgenic material that can be present in the event of contamination. 408 Before
the government can set tolerances, however, “it needs to know what kinds of genes are
present in grain or food.” 409 The Union of Concerned Scientists’ Gone to Seed report
indicates that the government does not have this information; therefore, transgenic
material from a variety of DNA sequences are possibly making their way into the
conventional seed supply, but there is no scientific basis on which to determine and
enforce tolerances. 410

On the other hand, consumers depend on certified organic products as an alternative to
conventionally raised food, many of which now contain transgenic ingredients.
Supporters of strong organic standards have worked hard to ensure that the organic label
represents the principles held by the organic movement, including the rejection of
genetically engineered products. Although “no sector of the food system is trying harder
to meet consumer demand for choice” than the organic industry, it is clear that
contamination events continue to threaten the integrity of the organic label. 411

Protecting Seed Purity
Seeds are the most fundamental component to agriculture and our food supply. 412 Seed
laws at both the federal and state level do not address the unintended presence of
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transgenic material in seed labeled as conventional or organic. 413 The NOP only requires
organic producers to use organically produced seeds (or conventionally produced seed if
organic is unavailable), and does not require testing of seeds to ensure the absence of
transgenes. If testing is conducted on seeds, and results show “significant quantities of
genetically modified DNA. . . even the most comprehensive post-planting controls for
admixture may fail to preserve the expected premiums for the farmer.” 414

Experience with other crops is instructive. For example, in 2002, North Dakota State
University’s Foundation Seedstocks Program identified transgenic contamination of a
special variety of soybean marketed to Japan and the EU. 415 The following year,
researchers at the University of Manitoba found that certified seed stocks of canola were
significantly contaminated by transgenic material, finding that 95 percent of 27 certified
seed lots were contaminated with transgenic DNA, some with traits that resist two
different herbicides. 416 Fourteen seed lots (52 percent) exceeded the .25 percent
maximum contamination standard for certified seed. 417

Compounding the problem of foundation and certified seed contamination is that seed
banks used to house collections of seeds essential for broadening the genetic diversity of
crops are deteriorating due to lack of resources. According to Paul Raeburn, author of
The Last Harvest: The Genetic Gamble That Threatens to Destroy American Agriculture,
seeds are the raw materials necessary for securing agricultural security, for improving
crops in the face of global warming, pollution and other new threats. 418 Therefore, it
becomes imperative to prevent genetic uniformity and protect the genetic diversity and
integrity of a variety of seeds, in the field as well as in the seed bank, including the
413
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containment of transgenic DNA. According to Farm Verified Organic, an organic
certification service in North Dakota: “The GM pollution of American commodities is
now so pervasive, we believe it is not possible for farmers in North America to source
seed free from it.” 419

The Coordinated Framework: Regulatory Shortcomings and Insufficient Oversight
Promises were made about containment and segregation, and they weren't
kept, and you might say they could never be kept.
- Philip Regal, University of Minnesota biologist 420
Twenty years have passed since the implementation of the Coordinated Framework. As
mentioned earlier, the laws that make up the framework were created before novel genes
derived from recombinant DNA technology entered the marketplace, and continue to be
the focus of controversy as new genetically engineered crops enter the marketplace. Not
surprisingly, the patchwork approach to regulation has created much confusion among
the public and regulated industries. 421 Some scientists argue that USDA oversight of field
trials is inadequate, a concern echoed by the Inspector General of Agriculture, and point
to weak risk assessments as well. Agency jurisdiction over regulating crops is generally
lacking and weak, lending to activists’ and scientists’ arguments that government
agencies are biased toward biotechnology firms.

Field Trials & Risk Assessments

Alfalfa is currently among the top ten crops for the most approved field trials, planted in
at least 35 states. 422 (Remember, when a manufacturer submits a notification for a field
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trial, there is no limit as to the amount of acreage that can be planted, and no limit as to
how many states one notification may cover.) Pollen drift may have occurred during RR
alfalfa field trials, and certainly could have entered organic fields during this time,
depending on where the field trials were conducted. For example, the state of Idaho
boasts the largest number of certified organic alfalfa hay acres, as well as the second
greatest number of RR alfalfa field trials (over 40), potentially covering thousands of
acres. 423 Because farmers are not given information regarding experimental field trials
happening in their communities, RR alfalfa may have entered organic or other
conventional alfalfa fields unbeknownst to the farmers nearby. 424 The recent audit report
that found APHIS’ current field trial oversight to be inadequate on several fronts,
including containment of transgenes, lends to the likelihood that RR traits have already
entered conventional alfalfa fields. 425

For notifications (which include RR alfalfa field trials), APHIS simply has to
“acknowledge” an applicant’s notification for field trials within 30 days, and does not
perform an Environmental Assessment before the environmental release. Even if
performance standards are followed, requirements specific to preventing the gene flow
are not adequate to completely stop the movement of pollen—and APHIS’
recommendations for containment are not legally enforceable. Furthermore, APHIS can
request additional information from applicants, but cannot require the requested
information be submitted. 426
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Furthermore, scientists criticize risk assessments conducted before commercial releases
as having “several inherent weaknesses.” 427 For example, the smaller scale of field
studies might not represent large-scale commercial production. As noted in an Ecological
Society of America study, “pre-commercial field studies are not likely to include the
large amount of replication needed to identify small but important effects.” 428 Scientists
claim that monitoring a GE crop after it is commercialized is crucial for identifying any
unintended effects, yet once deregulated, a commercialized GE crop is completely
removed from USDA’s oversight, including follow-up tests. 429 A 2002 National
Academy of Sciences report found that: “There has been no environmental monitoring of
these transgenic crops, so any effects that might have occurred could not have been
detected. The absence of evidence of an effect is not evidence of absence of an effect.” 430

Even if more stringent containment measures are implemented, there are no rules in place
requiring growers of RR alfalfa to adhere to them. As noted by University of California
Extension Farm Advisor, Shannon Mueller, “Although standards can be revised to
modify isolation and control pollination, movement of pollen beyond the borders of an
individual field cannot be prevented entirely.” 431
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Agency & Industry Oversight

Compounding the fact that RR alfalfa cross-pollinates with other varieties is the reality
that farmers who plant RR alfalfa for hay are not bound to any planting restrictions,
including containment measures. Instead, growers who plant RR alfalfa enter into
Monsanto’s “Technology/Stewardship Agreements” that acknowledge RR alfalfa is
capable of moving across field borders, but does not require growers to implement
containment strategies in their operations. Even if farmers are careful to harvest their RR
alfalfa hay before pollen is produced, ensuring this is impossible, and there is likely to be
some gene flow, especially in absence of biological barriers. All of these measures are
dependent on farmers’ oversight, and therefore allows for human error. 432 Even if a
buffer area or isolation distance for mitigating the spread of RR alfalfa pollen is
established, 100 percent containment is not possible, especially using one method of
containment. 433

Another inherent weakness of the Coordinated Framework is that it is not proactive. As
shown in the Starlink case, regulatory action is usually taken in response to events of
contamination. 434 The Coordinated Framework is based on the assumption that transgenic
crops behave the same way as conventional crops. 435 Yet, not only do several sources
point to a need for improvement in how genetically engineered crops are regulated in the
U.S., historical contamination events prove that 1) containment is extremely difficult, and
2) contamination events, if uncovered, are costly. 436 Moreover, contamination events are
432
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extremely difficult to fix, and may compromise organic and other conventional field
operations for years. This creates a dangerous scenario in light of potential human health
and ecological impacts. For example, should evidence surface that RR alfalfa is making
its way into alfalfa seed operations marketed to edible sprout producers, or that cows are
developing health problems from eating RR alfalfa hay, recalling a living technology
from the environment and removing products from a convoluted food system will likely
be a difficult, expensive, and lengthy process, as was seen with the StarLink case. 437

Agency Priorities

USDA may have a stronger interest in protecting the interests of large biotechnology
companies than they do in organic producers. The National Research Council concluded
that APHIS’ risk assessments may be biased toward a finding of no significant impact,
which means an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) will not be triggered. 438 In the
case of RR alfalfa, APHIS has been criticized by plaintiffs in the lawsuit challenging the
agency’s decision on RR alfalfa for not addressing the issue of organic contamination in
its Environmental Assessment, including the potential socio-economic impacts. 439
Similarly, the National Research Council speaks to this lack of attention to other farming
systems: “Currently, APHIS environmental assessments focus on the simplest ecological
scale. . .APHIS should include any impact on regional farming practice or systems in its
deregulation assessments.” 440

USDA also has a history of a “revolving door,” a label given to situations where
employees who work for the government sometimes regulate industries that they once
worked for or managed. 441 For example, Neil Hoffman, the Director of Biotechnology
437
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Regulatory Services in USDA once worked for a biotechnology company called
Paradigm Genetics, Inc. (now Icoria, Inc.), a firm that collaborated with Monsanto on
biotechnology projects. In 2005, the firm sold its Agricultural Genomics Assets to
Monsanto for over six million dollars. 442 The press release for this sale highlights the
conflict-of-interest for Mr. Hoffman, whose responsibility is to oversee APHIS’
biotechnology deregulation process for transgenic traits: “The acquired assets are related
to the field of transgenic traits for agriculture, which has been the focus of research
conducted under an existing six-year, $55-million agreement signed in 1999 between
Monsanto and Icoria, formerly Paradigm Genetics.” 443 Hoffman joined Paradigm
Genetics, Inc. in 1999, the same year the $55 million agreement was signed with
Monsanto. 444

Furthermore, of all the funds USDA allocates to biotechnology research, only one percent
goes toward risk assessment—about $1-2 million per year. 445 Given the current amount
of transgenic crop acreage—both field trials and commercial cultivation—these resources
are insufficient to even discover the “tip of the iceberg.” 446 Such funding seems
necessary if agencies continue to heavily rely on manufacturers’ own studies when
determining deregulation status of transgenic crops.
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Summary

Both the NOP and Coordinated Framework fail to address issues concerning the nature of
introducing RR alfalfa. Alfalfa is a perennial forage crop, meaning it remains in the
ground for more than one year (anywhere from three to twelve years). Because alfalfa is
insect-pollinated, transgenic traits will travel from field-to-field even with isolation
distances or biological barriers in place. Evidence for pollen flow shows that bees can
carry transgenic pollen for miles, making containment measures largely ineffective for
keeping RR alfalfa pollen within planting borders. No containment strategy is 100
percent effective, due to environmental factors and human error. Moreover, without
frequent testing of organic products, we will never learn the extent of the problem,
including whether organic alfalfa becomes contaminated by RR alfalfa. Regardless of any
measure taken to protect organic products from transgenic contamination, the burden of
protecting organic plants from transgenic pollen drift continues to be on the shoulders of
organic farmers.

We know that the organic market is growing, especially the market for organic alfalfa
hay, due to the expansion of organic livestock production. Neither the NOP and
Coordinated Framework go far enough to ensure that organic alfalfa will be protected in
the face of genetically engineered alfalfa. Though contamination of organic alfalfa could
have occurred in field trials, it is even more likely to occur now that RR alfalfa is
available for commercial production and is not bound to further oversight by APHIS,
including restrictions on planting.

And what about consumer confidence? After all, this is what drives market demand,
especially organic (since these foods are labeled). The outpouring of public comment in
response to the proposed NOP rules, and the way the organic industry united to preserve
the integrity of their products, show support for strong organic standards, including the
omission of products derived from genetic engineering. As these two industries grow, the
inability to keep GE material out of conventional seed varieties will continue to reduce
the integrity of organic food products, and makes it unrealistic for consumers to expect a

91

guarantee that all organic foods are free of GE material. If consumers purchasing organic
products to avoid genetically engineered ingredients learn that it is not uncommon for
transgenic material to make its way into organic products, it may be hard for them to trust
the label.

Can the two industries co-exist? That is, can transgenic crops and conventional (including
organic) be grown with little or no impact to the other? The advantages of concealing
contamination to both the organic and biotechnology industry is curious. Strictly
speaking from an economic perspective, fueling consumers’ belief that organic products
do not contain any transgenic material ensures two things. First, that organic products
deserve a premium price for being “pure”—that consumers are paying for a product that
meets their expectations. Second, that biotechnology companies can point to a complete
alternative to their own products, asserting that consumers do have a choice whether to
eat transgenic ingredients or not.

If the purpose of the NOP is to give consumers confidence in the legitimacy of products
sold as organic and to increase the supply and variety of available organic products, as
well as facilitate international trade in organic products, 447 then contamination of organic
products weakens all of these purposes: it lessens consumer confidence in the legitimacy
of products, and decreases the supply and variety of available organic products both for
domestic use and international trade. It appears that a large sector of the organic industry
will continue to push for more stringent containment of genetically engineered products.
It is what the consumers of organic products want, and it is what organic producers need
to—perhaps not meet the standards as they currently are written—but to fulfill the values
they see as inherent within organic agriculture. The principle of rejecting transgenic
material in organic agriculture systems will become moot if avoiding this technology
becomes impossible.

447

Rawson, J. M. (2005). Organic agriculture in the U.S.: Program and policy issues [Electronic version],
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service,
Retrieved on August 16, 2006, www.fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/57848.pdf

92

CONCLUSION
INTEGRITY IN THE ORGANIC MARKETPLACE
Our challenge is to develop practical strategies for promoting and
preserving organic integrity. We will be evaluated and judged on what
organics becomes as well as what we choose to leave out. It is up to all of
us. We must not become what we set out to be the sane alternative to.
- Michael Sligh, founding chair, National Organic Standards Board 448

The organic and biotechnology industries have enjoyed enormous growth in the last
decade. They also have had their share of controversies; yet, continue to expand their
presence in the field and the marketplace. As they do, it becomes clear that their products
cannot remain separate, that “co-existence” is not possible, because genetically
engineered crops are essentially living technologies. They do not belong and are not
allowed in organic fields and products, but continue to show up there, becoming a burden
that some organic producers pay to avoid and sometimes eradicate.

This paper looked at two regulatory frameworks important to U.S. agriculture: The
National Organic Program (NOP) and Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of
Biotechnology. Using Roundup Ready (RR) alfalfa as a case study was useful in
understanding the role of these laws and regulations, but also helped to illustrate a larger
problem with the existing frameworks. Although both industries acknowledge that
transgenic material is moving into fields and markets where it is not allowed or wanted,
little has been done to address the problem through the regulatory processes outlined in
this paper.

The biotechnology industry does not believe contamination is serious enough to claim
that “co-existence” between its products and those certified organic is not possible.
However, disbelief in “co-existence” has motivated some producers and processors to test
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their organic products, uncovering a disturbing pattern of contamination events. As these
two industries continue to grow side-by-side, experience with GE crops coupled with
insufficient regulatory frameworks point to a future where contaminated organic products
is commonplace.

This is unfortunate in light of the organic industry’s efforts to ensure that strong organic
standards were established to protect the integrity of organic products. Clearly, many
consumers purchase organic products to avoid genetically engineered ingredients in their
food. While consumer confidence in organic products affords the biotechnology industry
an opportunity to point to a complete alternative to its genetically engineered products, it
also places organic farmers in an awkward position. In the event contamination is
detected, organic farmers must choose between maintaining the integrity of the products
they provide to the organic market and knowingly sending contaminated products to the
organic market. As this paper shows, the organic standards allow for an unlimited amount
of contamination by transgenic material, as long as the excluded material was not
intentionally used. Furthermore, the NOP does not require testing, so the extent of
contamination in organic products is largely unknown, and will likely continue to be
unknown, as there is no real incentive for a certifier or producer to test organic seeds and
harvests.

The NOP also places organic farmers in a vulnerable position. Consumers have
established an implied zero tolerance for transgenic material in organic products, and
polls show confidence in organic products as clear alternatives to GE ingredients. The
biotechnology industry has also been influenced by consumers’ perceptions of its
technologies, including a burgeoning interest in “consumer-oriented” traits and an
abandonment of research projects involving herbicide-tolerant traits in popular foods,
including wheat, lettuce, and strawberries, to name a few. The organic industry risks
losing credibility altogether should a large part of its consumer base become aware that
transgenic material is contaminating some organic products. And this risk is closer than
the organic industry may like to admit, because the reality is that transgenic material has
been entering the organic marketplace for years. The NOP and Coordinated Framework
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do not go far enough to ensure that genetically engineered material stays contained and
out of fields and marketplaces where it is not wanted and allowed. The two regulatory
frameworks are not protecting the integrity of organic products, and certainly will not
protect the integrity of organic alfalfa if Roundup Ready (RR) alfalfa is widely adopted.

Thus, it seems that organic farmers should have recourses in the event genetically
engineered material enters their crops. As part of their “organic plan,” farmers are
supposed to implement measures to protect their crops from excluded material, including
pesticide and transgenic drift, such as planting buffer areas and purchasing organically
produced seed. Yet farmers who grow herbicide-tolerant crops are not bound to any
planting restrictions to mitigate the movement of transgenes to their neighbors’ fields.
Therefore, organic farmers are left with the economic and agronomic costs of detecting
and eradicating GE material, taking measures to avoid future contamination, and
receiving a lower price for their products (unless they send the contaminated product to
the organic market).

USDA does not view GE and organic crops as different from conventionally raised crops.
Still, the NOP establishes labeling for certified organic crops, while the Coordinated
Framework does not, which is curious: GE crops are patented, meaning the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office has determined them to be “novel.” The history of plant patents
involves intense debates and litigation. According to Daniel Charles, author of Lords of
the Harvest: Biotech, Big Money, and the Future of Food, patents are the “bedrock on
which the biotechnology industry is built.” 449 He writes that the industry learned early on
that discoveries are only useful if they lead to a “proprietary position,” in his words:
“something approaching monopoly.” 450

Biotechnology companies capitalize off current patent law to maintain not just profit, but
control over markets, and ultimately, farmers. Only, the effects reach further than patent
numbers on seed bags and royalty fees to the company. Seeds tie farmers to the land, to
449
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their livelihood, and this relationship is altered when seeds are owned by the companies
producing them even after money is exchanged, even after the seed is sown. Of course,
seeds are unique pieces of property: they self-propagate. Patents follow transgenes
wherever they turn up, including a neighbor’s field. The legal issues around patented
seeds are numerous. There are liability risks around contamination of conventional crops,
and contract law issues concerning license agreements (Monsanto’s Technology
Agreements), including the misuse of the technology. 451 Additionally, liability concerns
associated with non-GE seed and marketing contracts include contamination of crops
destined for non-GE markets, the consequence of which forces the farmer to find and pay
for a replacement crop or compensate the buyer. 452 Again, the onus of dealing with
unwanted GE material falls squarely on the shoulders of non-GE producers; yet, in many
cases, the contamination is not the farmer’s fault. It begs the question: Is this a case for
the U.S. courts?

One legal scholar has written extensively about the potential role of the U.S. judicial
system in conventional and organic contamination events involving agricultural
biotechnology. Drew L. Kershen’s law review articles explore recourses farmers can take
in the event they are contaminated by GE material by placing the contamination event
into the context of the following claims: civil and strict liability; damage to property,
person, and economic interests (markets); trespass; negligence; and private nuisance. 453
Four of these claims—trespass, nuisance, strict liability, and negligence—are part of a
lawsuit filed on behalf of all certified organic farmers in Saskatchewan. The lawsuit seeks
compensation from Monsanto and Aventis Cropscience for damage to organic canola
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farmers by the companies’ GE varieties. 454 According to the 2002 Saskatchewan Organic
Directorate press release, “The claim alleges that GE canola has spread across the prairies
and contaminated conventional crops so extensively that most certified organic grain
farmers no longer attempt to grow canola.”455 In May 2005, the judge rejected the case as
a class-action lawsuit; the two farmers filed an appeal the same month. 456 The appeal was
granted and the class action lawsuit status is still to be determined.

Perhaps the most notable and publicized case involving contamination by transgenic
crops is another Canadian case, Monsanto Company vs. Percy Schmeiser. Percy
Schmeiser, a canola breeder and farmer, was found guilty of patent infringement for
having Monsanto’s patented canola genes on his property. In an appeal to the Supreme
Court, he argued that his canola was contaminated by Monsanto’s traits and that he
should not be liable for possessing unwanted patented traits in his plants—traits that
ruined years of careful canola breeding. In a close decision, the Supreme Court of Canada
ruled in favor of Monsanto, deciding that it did not matter how the GE material made its
way onto his property and into his plants, that he was guilty for possessing Monsanto’s
patented genes without a license.

Legal scholars expect litigation to play a role in future U.S. contamination lawsuits,
similar to the two cases described above. Although U.S. courts have not seen an organic
contamination case, the U.S. Court for the Northern District of California will soon play
an important role in the future of RR alfalfa, which, as revealed in this paper, has the
potential to significantly affect the organic industry. The potential implications of
introducing RR alfalfa into the environment and marketplace point to many economic,
agronomic, and environmental risks, including: chemical drift from an increase in
herbicide use, gene flow from RR alfalfa to organic, conventional, and feral alfalfa,
market rejection due to organic and export product contamination, economic risks to
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honey and sprout industries, and impacts to foundation and certified alfalfa seed—an
important component to U.S. food and agriculture security. APHIS did not heed many of
these concerns in approving RR alfalfa for commercial production, concerns voiced by
over 500 citizens during the RR alfalfa comment period. Thus, the agency’s decision
spurred the first lawsuit to be filed in response to the approval of a single GE crop. In
February 2006, alfalfa seed producers (including an organic producer) and several public
interest organizations filed a lawsuit against the USDA for its approval of RR alfalfa. The
case is still pending, and if the plaintiffs succeed, the court may require APHIS to
conduct a full Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and an injunction on further sales
of RR alfalfa.

Practicing Democracy: Local Initiatives Go Further Than Federal Rules

More progress on protecting organic farming from GE crops has been made through local
initiatives than in the U.S. courtroom. These local initiatives seek to address the
shortcomings of federal regulations governing GE crops, and to ultimately avoid
scenarios similar to the cases explained above. The community actions have garnered
much attention, and are laudable forces effecting change at the local level. Although no
state has ever enacted regulations governing GE crops, five counties in California have
passed initiatives that place limitations on agricultural biotechnology, most of which ban
growing genetically engineered crops. 457 And nearly 100 New England towns have
passed resolutions regarding GE crops, almost a quarter of which call for local moratoria
on planting GE seeds. 458

Though these local initiatives typically cover a relatively small area and population,
biotechnology companies have responded vigorously by proposing a series of preemption
bills aimed to dissolve local and state control over seeds and plants. According to the Pew
Initiative on Food and Biotechnology, “Preemption bills represented the single largest
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share of adopted state legislation on agricultural biotechnology in 2005 (40 percent of all
bills adopted).” 459 As of August 2006, these preemption bills have been successful in 15
states. 460 Opponents of the preemption bills believe they undermine democracy and local
control over public health issues, and take away communities’ right “to address important
gaps in federal and state policy.” 461 Specifically, to address problems pertaining to GE
crops that are not adequately addressed by federal regulations. 462

While these local efforts help mitigate potential risks of GE seeds and crops, can the
federal regulations be changed to properly address the problems that local initiatives try
to remedy? What will it take to keep biotechnology out of organic products? I conclude
that the only way the integrity of organic agriculture can be protected is to ban
genetically engineered crops from agricultural fields. Numerous scientists argue that
complete containment is not possible, that the continued movement of transgenes into
markets that reject genetically engineered products is a certainty. Additionally, a
precautionary approach to GE crops is warranted for several reasons: regulatory
frameworks are not adequate to address the uncontrollable nature of these living
technologies, and reversing contamination events is extremely difficult, if not impossible,
which compromises the safety of the food system and environment should evidence
surface that the technology is harmful.

Still, the companies producing seed technologies have convinced government agencies
that the technology does not pose any new risks and that “co-existence” is a reality.
Barring the removal of genetically engineered seeds and plants from the environment and
marketplace, there are several steps that can be taken to lessen the impact of genetically
engineered crops on the organic industry. Below are five policy recommendations that
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address issues associated with the unwanted contamination of organic products by GE
material.

1) The Process for Regulating GE Crops Needs a Major Overhaul

APHIS’ oversight of GE crops needs to be improved, starting with field trials. First,
recommendations given by the Inspector General of Agriculture in its 2004 audit report
on APHIS’ oversight of field trials should be adopted. Clearly, both organic and
conventional crops risk contamination by GE crops not approved for commercial use.
Strengthening field trial oversight could involve more involvement of state agriculture
departments. For deregulated crops, a monitoring program should be implemented as a
way to identify risks not identified in risk assessments during field trials. Most
significantly, USDA should require growers of GE crops to establish buffer areas and
other containment measures to mitigate pollen flow from RR crops to neighboring fields.
USDA should also require patent holders to fund a bond that is available to organic and
conventional farmers who are harmed by contamination of their technologies. 463

2) The Government Needs to Protect the Public Interest

USDA should conduct a comprehensive evaluation of contamination in organic and
conventional seeds, including foundation and certified seed, as well as food products, to
determine the extent and content of genetic contamination in non-GE products. Such an
evaluation would allow the government to begin owning up to its responsibility to protect
the public interest. Both the FDA and USDA claim that organic products are alternatives
to GE food, and must ensure that consumers continue to have a choice between the two.
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A similar bond was introduced through legislation in Montana, but died in the Senate Committee on
Agriculture, Livestock, and Irrigation in 2003. Senate Bill 266 said that “Any company holding a patent for
genetically engineered wheat varieties that wishes to begin commercial production in Montana must post a
$10M bond with the newly formed Wheat Bond Board. Legislation also outlines the membership and
duties of the board and stipulates that a company's liability is not limited to the bond value.” (Pew Initiative
on Food and Biotechnology. (2005). State legislative activity related to agricultural biotechnology in 2005,
Retrieved on November 15, 2006 from
http://pewagbiotech.org/resources/factsheets/legislation/factsheet.php)
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3) The Organic Industry Must Confront Contamination

The organic industry cannot ignore the contamination issue. Even if the standards allow
for the unintended presence of transgenic material in organic products, consumers
deserve to know the reality of contamination, and should be mobilized to protect the
integrity of organic products. The NOP was built on transparency, and not addressing the
contamination issue now will lead to future problems that may prove irreversible,
including losing consumers’ confidence in the organic label. The organic industry fought
hard for standards that reflect several principles inherent within organic agriculture
during the beginning phases of the NOP, and excluding GE products was an important
component of this value system.

4) The Organic Industry Should Discuss the Issues of Testing and Tolerance Levels

The testing and tolerance issues need to be discussed by the organic industry to weigh the
benefits and risks of establishing a tolerance level for transgenic material in organic
products, as well as possibly imposing a testing system (perhaps for seeds). Currently, the
standards do not set a limit for an allowable amount of unwanted transgenic material in
organic products. Without testing, the amount and extent of contamination remains
largely unknown. So, there is no scientific basis to determine and enforce tolerance
levels. Because the onus of protecting organic products from transgenic contamination is
on the organic producers, testing costs should not fall on their shoulders, but need to
come from the owners of the patents and perhaps growers of the technology. The organic
industry should discuss these two issues, and demand that the biotechnology industry
front costs for the unwanted presence of its technology.

5) RR alfalfa should be removed from the market until a full EIS is performed

USDA is currently performing its first Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) on a GE
crop: RR creeping bentgrass, another perennial plant that, like alfalfa, cross-pollinates
with relatives. USDA should do the same for RR alfalfa, paying close attention to
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potential economic risks to regional farming practices and markets, especially organic. In
light of precedents set by other RR crops, a precautionary approach should be taken to the
introduction of RR alfalfa in order to protect sensitive markets and the integrity of
organic and conventional alfalfa seed. If nothing else, RR alfalfa producers should be
required to implement isolation distances and buffer zones to mitigate gene flow, as well
as communicate with neighboring alfalfa farmers about the potential for transgene flow to
surrounding plants. Neighboring farms would then be able to better protect any sensitive
markets through cautious management and testing.

Alfalfa is the starting point of countless foods. It is feed for dairy cows and beef cattle,
for lambs, pigs, and honeybees. So, even if we do not see alfalfa on our dinner plates, it
plays a crucial role in the food we do eat—it is a staple of the American farming diet. For
consumers who value organic livestock products—milk and ice cream derived from cows
not fed RR hay—this choice may disappear if RR alfalfa is widely adopted. As the
demand for organic alfalfa grows, organic farmers may find it challenging to locate
alfalfa seeds free of transgenic traits, as they have found it challenging in the face of GE
corn, soybeans, and canola. And alfalfa is pervasive, covering over 22 million acres
across the United States. Therefore, transgenic traits serve as a reminder of the
interconnectedness of things, of the persistence of life, of plants—of pollinators. GE
crops are already woven into the North American landscape, threads of DNA that are
reproduced time and time again, effectively spreading a living technology for years to
come.

These policy recommendations are just a few of many that could be implemented.
Several more steps can be taken to keep transgenic crops contained, to shift some of the
burden to protect the organic industry onto the shoulders of the patent owner and grower
of GE crops. However, from the perspective of the organic industry, taking a
precautionary approach to this technology seems ideal. The organic industry has always
been concerned with the integrity of its products, and currently GE crops, including RR
alfalfa, may be the biggest threat to maintaining crops and products that meet the
collective vision of what constitutes a truly organic agriculture. The organic movement
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enjoyed success the last time it mobilized in response to threats to the organic standards.
It may be time to step up again, to a threat that was only partially dealt with at the time
the rules were written. Although genetic engineering is an “excluded method,” its
presence in organic products shows it is far from being totally excluded.

Indeed, RR alfalfa is on the market and has been sown in several states, but its
introduction has been relatively limited. The federal government and both the organic and
biotechnology industries need to acknowledge the precedent that RR alfalfa follows—the
uncontrollable nature of living technologies, the inability to keep these technologies fully
contained and out of organic food. Protecting the integrity of organic seed and feed
sources can begin, as so many of our food products, with alfalfa.
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